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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Two Essays in Corporate Finance. (December 2010) 
Jessica Marie Rutherford, B.A., The University of Connecticut; 
M.S., The University of Texas at San Antonio 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:        Dr. Michael Gallmeyer 
           Dr. Shane Johnson                               
 
 
                      
CEO succession decisions are an important part of boards of directors’ 
responsibilities to shareholders.  I study two aspects of these decisions.  First, I examine 
whether or not forced CEO departure decisions are based on information that the board 
of directors has, but external investors do not.  I find that the proxy for private 
information in the forced CEO departure decision is positively related to abnormal 
returns at the forced CEO departure announcement.  This is consistent with the 
hypotheses that prior to the departure announcement, investors underestimate the 
probability of forced CEO departure, and that private information revealed in forced 
CEO departure announcements has positive implications for firm value.   
A second question related to boards of directors’ CEO succession decisions 
concerns their decisions to participate in the external market for CEO talent.  I find 
evidence suggesting that board decisions to participate in the external market for CEO 
talent are influenced by the costs and benefits of doing so. Specifically, cross sectional 
analyses of a proxy for industry homogeneity shows that this variable is positively 
related to external labor market participation, more standardized search processes, and a 
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higher likelihood that a newly appointed CEO will survive three years or more.  These 
findings are generally consistent with prediction that when industries are more 
homogenous, external search costs are lower, and higher quality matches may be 
obtained.   I also test hypotheses related to benefits of matching to individuals with 
industry specific skills versus general management skills.  I find that for several 
alternative proxies for industry specific skill demand, there is a negative relation 
between demand for industry specific skills and the decision to hire externally outside 
the industry.   This can be interpreted as support for hypotheses that cross sectional 
variation in benefits associated with industry specific skills leads to fewer CEO 
appointments outside the industry, while benefits of general management skills are 
associated with a higher likelihood of inter-industry CEO appointment. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Board decisions related to CEO successions may significantly impact shareholder 
wealth.  This dissertation presents empirical analysis of two aspects of boards of 
directors’ CEO succession decisions.  First, I present analysis of the value effects of 
private information that is revealed in forced chief executive officer (CEO) departure 
announcements.  A board that acts to maximize firm value should replace the CEO if the 
net benefit of doing so is positive after taking into account costs associated with 
severance pay, search costs, increased pay to the successor CEO, and possible disruption 
to business operations.  If the market has unbiased expectations of both the net benefits 
of CEO replacement and the probability that the CEO will be replaced, then the 
announcement of a forced CEO departure is not expected to convey new information to 
external investors.    
It is possible, however, that outside investors have less information about key 
facts than the firm’s board has. First, even if relative performance measures clearly 
indicate that an individual firm is underperforming its peer firms; outsiders may face 
uncertainty about whether a different CEO could have done better managing that 
particular firm. Outsiders may therefore underestimate the net benefit of replacing the 
CEO and thus, underestimate the likelihood that a value-maximizing board would 
implement the replacement.  Second, outsiders may be uncertain about whether 
 
__________ 
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 a firm’s board of directors is willing to terminate a non-value-maximizing CEO.  The 
two sources of uncertainty are not mutually exclusive. When a board decides to 
terminate a CEO, the uncertainty about these key facts is resolved.    
 Much of the existing literature related to CEO and other senior executive 
departure announcements focuses on mean returns. When expectations regarding forced 
CEO departures are unbiased, mean returns are not expected to be significantly different 
from zero.  If information revealed in executive departure announcements results in 
mean returns that are significantly different from zero, then the location of the mean 
provides evidence that value relevant information has been released in the executive 
turnover announcement.  The evidence provided by these studies is not conclusive.   
Weisbach (1988), Bonnier and Bruner (1989) and Denis and Denis (1995) find positive 
mean returns;  Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) find that mean returns are not 
significantly different from zero; and more recently, Jenter and Kanaan (2008) find 
negative mean returns for a sample of CEO departure announcements.   
I take an alternative approach, based on the argument that a significant cross-
sectional relation between private information in CEO departure decisions and 
announcement period abnormal returns may exist, even if mean returns are not 
significantly different from zero.   I use a novel proxy for private information in 
corporate decisions suggested by Prabhala (1997) and Li and Prabhala (2005) to 
examine the cross-sectional relation between private information used by the board in 
the CEO departure decision, and abnormal returns at the departure announcement.   
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I hypothesize that private information revealed in forced CEO departure 
announcements will be positively related to abnormal returns if the market 
underestimates the probability that the CEO will be replaced.  I hand collect a data set of 
1,129 CEO departure events during fiscal years 1997-2005.   Using information from 
news announcements and proxy statements, I identify CEO departure and appointment 
announcement dates for each succession.  I also identify the circumstances of the 
incumbent CEO's departure.  Because the focus of the study is the information revealed 
in CEO departure announcements, CEO departures are classified based upon varying 
degrees of departure announcement information content.   CEO departures are 
categorized as planned, unplanned voluntary, and forced.  Planned successions are 
usually retirements, and are expected to convey very little new information.  Unplanned 
voluntary CEO departures may convey some private information if some forced 
departures are incorrectly classified as voluntary due to firm discretion in announcing 
forced departures as “retirements.”  Forced departures are more likely to reveal private 
information about the net benefits of CEO replacement and internal governance strength.   
 I first estimate selection models.   The selection models include characteristics of 
the CEO, firm size, operating and stock price performance, industry homogeneity, 
industry and stock market performance, and board structure variables as factors that may 
affect alternative CEO departure decisions. Two separate proxies for private information 
in the CEO departure decision are estimated.  The first is based on the choice of forced 
CEO turnover rather than a no turnover reference category, after dropping voluntary 
CEO departures from the sample.  I also model the choice of involuntary CEO 
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departures versus voluntary CEO departures, conditional on a CEO departure occurring.  
This allows estimation of a proxy for private information revealed in the choice of 
involuntary rather than voluntary CEO departures that is ignored when comparing 
involuntary departures to the no turnover reference category. 
 The empirical results indicate that CEO departure abnormal returns are positively 
related to private information revealed in the choice of forced CEO departures rather 
than the no turnover alternative, and the choice of a forced CEO departure rather than 
the involuntary departure alternative.  The proxy for private information in the departure 
decision is not significantly related to departure announcement returns for voluntary 
departures.      
  CEO departures are often announced simultaneously with the replacement of the 
successor CEO.  I partition the sample based on replacement CEO appointment 
announcements that are made on the same day as the incumbent CEO’s departure 
announcement, and those that are announced on separate days.  The positive relation 
between forced CEO departure announcement abnormal returns and the proxy for 
private information remains consistently statistically significant in the subsample of 
forced CEO departures with separate announcement dates.  In the subsample of CEO 
departure announcements that are made on the same day as the replacement CEO's 
appointment announcement, the relation between the announcement return and the proxy 
for private information is still positive, but significance levels are less consistent.  When 
the successor CEO’s appointment announcement is made on the same day as the 
departure announcement, there is lower cross-sectional variation in abnormal 
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announcement returns.  The lower cross-sectional variation of cumulative abnormal 
returns in the same day departure and appointment announcement subsample may be one 
reason why the relation between the proxy for private information and the abnormal 
announcement returns is statistically weaker in this subsample. 
The positive cross-sectional relation between the proxy for private information 
and forced CEO departure abnormal returns provides evidence that the market 
underestimates forced departure probabilities prior to CEO departure announcements.  
The analyses do not distinguish between two possible reasons why the forced departure 
probabilities are underestimated.  One possible reason is that external market 
participants underestimate the net benefit of replacing the CEO.  The second is that 
investors have unbiased expectations regarding the net benefits of replacing the CEO, 
but underestimate the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms needed to 
actually fire the current CEO and hire the more qualified replacement.  These two 
explanations are not mutually exclusive within the sample, or within individual firms.   
A second important aspect of boards of directors’ CEO succession decisions 
includes decisions to participate in the external market for CEO talent rather than 
developing and promoting internal candidates.  Heterogeneity of high level firm 
executives’ experience and skill sets may significantly influence corporate decisions and 
firm value.
1
    
                                                 
1
 A number of recent papers investigate heterogeneity of CEOs in terms of rationality (Malmendier and 
Tate (2005, 2008), Goel and Thakor (2008)), ability (Baranchuk, MacDonald, and Yang (2008), Gabaix 
and Landier (2008)), and the match of the executives’ skills or personality traits to particular firms 
(Parrino (1997), Allgood and Farrell (2003), Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Graham Harvey and Puri 
(2008), Nagel and Hardin (2008)). 
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Thus, understanding the processes and mechanisms by which heterogeneous individuals 
are matched to particular firms should be important.  This analysis focuses on the 
decision by firms to participate in the external market for CEO talent versus promoting 
an internal candidate.   Internal and external candidates differ in terms of the processes 
by which they are matched to the CEO position; and also in the complex match 
characteristics that obtain when the executive is appointed.  Because the decision to 
search in the external market for CEO talent precedes the external search for the new 
CEO, usually signals the elimination of internal candidates, and results in a very 
different search process, understanding the decision to participate in the external market 
for CEO talent is a prerequisite for analysis of the complex match outcomes that obtain 
when a new CEO is appointed.   
The empirical analysis related to firms’ decisions to participate in the external 
market for CEO talent is based upon a framework integrating existing theories about 
costs and benefits of transacting in the external market for CEO talent that extends 
Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. While Coase’s original theory assumes that resources 
exchanged in the external market are perfect substitutes for those that can be produced 
internally, in the case of human resources, this is not the case. Internal and external 
executives may differ significantly in terms of industry specific versus general 
management experience and expertise. Internal and external candidates may also have 
varying levels of expertise related to improving firm performance and making strategic 
choices in the face of changing external conditions.  
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CEO heterogeneity on these, and possibly other dimensions may increase the 
perceived benefits of searching in the external market for the best possible match.  Firms 
may demand relatively high levels of particular skill sets or skill set combinations, and 
considering a wider set of possible candidates should increase the likelihood that the 
firm will find the best possible match, especially for skills such as general management 
skills or performance improvement experience that may be more easily transferred 
between firms.  Thus, heterogeneity of individual skills and expertise may increase 
firm’s incentives to participate in the external market for CEO talent.  Expected benefits 
of considering external candidates may be large in terms of their effect upon firm value; 
therefore proxies for firms’ demand for particular skills sets are expected to have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of external labor market participation.   
At the same time, heterogeneity of individual candidates in the external market 
makes the search process more complex and therefore more costly. When the perceived 
benefits of hiring externally are low, ceteris paribus, search costs should be more likely 
to bind. Consequently, I predict that the proxy for external search costs will matter more 
in the subsample of firms with relatively low perceived benefits of participating in the 
external market for CEO talent.   
A substantial body of evidence already exists related to potential benefits of 
external successions related to performance improvement, and several recent working 
papers analyze CEO firm matches in the context of changing external conditions. In this 
empirical analysis I focus on the importance of external hiring costs and benefits related 
to demand for industry specific versus general management skills in external CEO 
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succession decisions. Because general management skills are difficult to measure 
directly in terms of individual firms’ demand or individual CEOs’ supply, empirical 
work focuses on proxies for industry specific skill demand, which is expected to be 
inversely related to general management expertise demand.  
Analysis of CEO replacement decisions is based on a dataset that includes 578 
planned successions, 473 unplanned retirements, 57 CEOs who are hired away by other 
firms, 30 CEO departures related to health problems or death, and 449 forced 
departures
2
. The full sample includes 1,587 CEO succession events, 1,133 of which are 
internal. The remaining 454 are external successions. 
Empirical results are broadly consistent with our hypotheses related to the costs 
and benefits of participation in the external market for CEO talent. A proxy for external 
hiring costs based upon industry homogeneity suggested by Parrino (1997) does 
influence the likelihood of an external hire, conditional upon controls for external hiring 
benefits. While the proxy for industry homogeneity is unrelated to external hiring 
decisions in the full turnover sample, firms operating in more homogenous industries are 
more likely to participate in the external market for CEO talent when implementing 
routine planned successions.  The higher level of industry homogeneity may make it 
easier for firms to match to individuals who have expertise that is relevant to the hiring 
firm’s production technology and product markets when hiring externally, but within the 
industry.  
                                                 
2
 Based on Parrino’s(1997) method of identifying involuntary CEO departures. 
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I provide additional analysis of how a higher level of industry homogeneity 
makes external CEO searches less costly by focusing on external search mechanisms. I 
create an indicator of firm’s self-reported hiring of an executive search firm to aid in the 
CEO search process, and find that firms in more homogenous industries are more likely 
to hire search professionals to aid in the external search. This is consistent with the 
expectation that when firms seek to match to external candidates based on industry 
specific skills and expertise, the dimensions on which the firm seeks to match are more 
easily observed by outside consultants when the firm operates in a more homogenous 
industry. Under these circumstances, the board can outsource some search 
responsibilities to professionals who specialize in the executive search process.  
Third, when firms do participate in the external market for CEO talent, those 
operating in more homogenous industries are more likely to have the newly hired CEO 
survive for three years or more. This provides support for the prediction that firms 
operating in industries that have more similar production technology and product 
markets are able to make higher quality external matches, which result in fewer repeat 
turnovers early in the new CEO’s tenure. 
With regards to external hiring benefits derived from variation in industry 
specific versus general management expertise, I hypothesize that firm focus, a proxy for 
firms’ demand for industry specific skills, will be negatively related to the likelihood of 
hiring outside the industry. Consistent with this, the firm focus measure is negatively 
related to the choice of an external inter-industry succession rather than an internal 
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succession, and also negatively related to the choice of hiring outside the industry rather 
than inside the industry, conditional upon an external succession being chosen.  
Additionally, I hypothesize that poor performance in terms of basic operating 
performance differs from poor stock price performance in that problems with operating 
performance require focus on firm’s basic operations in product markets and production 
technology; while problems with stock price performance may require modifications to 
firm strategy that are not directly related to the firm’s core operations. Therefore, 
industry adjusted operating performance is expected to be negatively related to external 
hiring within the industry, and unrelated to external hiring outside the industry.  Holding 
stock price performance constant, industry adjusted operating return on assets is 
negatively related to the likelihood that the firm will hire externally within the industry 
rather than promoting from within. It is unrelated to the likelihood of hiring externally 
outside the industry. Moreover, conditional on an external succession being chosen, the 
likelihood of an inter-industry succession being chosen over an intra-industry succession 
is positively related to industry adjusted operating performance. These results suggest 
that poor operating performance is a problem that requires industry specific experience 
on the part of the incoming CEO. 
Finally, I present supplementary evidence related to firms’ demand for industry 
specific versus general management skills and inter-industry hiring decisions by 
collecting information on newly hired CEOs’ skills and expertise as reported by the 
hiring firm. This analysis is based upon the subsample of firm years in which external 
CEO appointments occur.  Firms appointing new CEOs from outside the industry are 
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more likely to use keywords related to general management skills; while firms 
appointing new CEOs within the industry are more likely to use keywords related to 
technology, operations, and industry experience when describing the new CEO’s 
qualifications for the new job. These results also provide support for the hypothesis that 
firms appointing new CEOs from within the industry are more likely to be matching on 
industry specific skill sets, while firms appointing new CEOs from outside the industry 
are more likely to match on general management skills.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:  Sections 2 through 6 
present the motivation, empirical evidence, and discussion related to the analysis of 
private information used by the board in CEO replacement decisions.  Sections 7 
through 10 present the background, empirical evidence, and discussion of results related 
to the costs and benefits of participating in the external market for CEO talent.  Section 
11 concludes. 
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2.  BACKGROUND, HYPOTHESES, AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THE 
ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN CEO REPLACEMENT 
DECISIONS 
 
2.1 Motivation and hypotheses 
When the board possesses private information about a CEO’s performance and 
possible benefits of replacing the CEO that external investors do not have, CEO 
departure announcements may have a significant effect upon stock price.  This effect is 
expected to be positive if boards force out CEOs only when the net benefits of doing so 
are positive.  CEO turnovers involve costs associated with severance pay to the 
departing CEO, search costs, and possibly also disruption to business operations during 
the succession, and higher total compensation may be required to attract a replacement 
CEO.  Boards that act to maximize firm value should initiate involuntary CEO 
departures when they expect that the higher value generated by the replacement CEO 
exceeds what would have been generated by the incumbent, after taking into account 
turnover costs.   
Assessing whether or not another individual could generate higher firm value at 
any given firm may be difficult, given that possible replacement CEO’s performance can 
only be evaluated in other positions at the same firm, or in other firms entirely.  Relative 
performance evaluation may provide evidence that a firm as a whole is underperforming 
benchmark firms; but some judgment is still needed to determine whether or not the 
firm’s performance would have been different had another CEO been in place.   Because 
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boards have opportunities to acquire highly specific information about a CEO’s 
decisions, activities, and the rationale behind the decisions and actions taken, they may 
possess private information regarding the extent to which poor firm performance is 
directly attributable to the current CEO. If external analysts and investors face 
information asymmetry problems with regards to the benefits of replacing the CEO, they 
may underestimate both the benefit of replacing the CEO, and the probability that he will 
be replaced.  Under these conditions, the announcement that the board has chosen to 
replace the CEO will convey new information with positive value implications to the 
market. 
It is possible, however, that investors might underestimate the probability of 
CEO replacement even if public information clearly indicates that poor relative 
performance is directly attributable to the CEO, and that possible replacements could do 
better.  If investors believe that the net benefits of CEO replacement are positive, but 
doubt the board’s ability or willingness to replace the CEO, then the announcement of a 
forced CEO departure may still convey new information to the market
3
.   Prior to the 
departure announcement, positive information about the net benefits of CEO 
replacement would not be incorporated into stock price, because of doubt that such a 
replacement was likely to occur.  This is an alternative reason why external investors 
might be positively surprised by forced CEO departures. 
 Value relevant private information released in forced CEO departures may have a 
significant cross-sectional relation to abnormal announcement returns even if mean 
                                                 
3
 Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) also discuss this type of information asymmetry. 
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returns are not significantly different from zero.
 4
  I therefore formulate hypotheses 
focusing on the cross sectional relation between stock price reactions to CEO departure 
announcements and private information in the CEO departure decision, conditional on 
publicly available information prior to the turnover event.  The empirical approach and 
the construction of the proxy for private information are described in Section 2.2.   
1) External investors do not have full access to information that the board has in 
making CEO departure decisions.  They therefore underestimate the probability of 
forced CEO departures occurring because:  
a) Net benefits of CEO replacement are underestimated and/or 
b) Internal governance strength is underestimated 
A proxy for private information in the forced CEO departure decision is positively 
related to abnormal returns at the announcement 
2)   Information regarding net benefits of CEO replacement is public information and  
      the true probabilities of forced CEO departures are publicly known.  The proxy for  
        private information is not significantly related to abnormal returns at the departure  
        announcement  
 Past event studies of executive turnover announcements often include executives 
other than CEOs, and time periods of the turnover samples studied range from the late 
1960s to the early 2000s.   
                                                 
4
 Warner Watts and Wruck (1988) employ tests for differences in variance between subsamples of an 
executive turnover announcement abnormal returns sample.  This tests for whether a stock price effect 
exists, without requiring that a positive or negative effect dominates at the mean.   
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Earlier studies of CEO turnover are often based upon 500 large firms included in the 
Forbes magazine surveys, while more recent studies are more likely to focus on the S&P 
1500.  The way in which forced and voluntary departures are defined varies, and most 
studies do not control for departure announcements that are made on the same day as the 
successor CEO's appointment announcement, and those that are made on separate dates.  
This makes direct comparison of results difficult.  With this caveat in mind, I present a 
brief overview of prior executive departure event studies.   
 Several studies find that executive departure announcement returns are either 
positive, or not significantly different from zero.  Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) 
examine top management changes including CEOs, chairmen, and presidents.  Planned 
retirements excluded from the sample.  He finds that mean returns are not significantly 
different from zero.  Bonnier and Bruner (1989), and Denis and Denis (1995) examine 
top management changes in financially distressed firms, and forced departure 
circumstances, respectively.  Both find that the departure announcements have positive 
abnormal returns.  Likewise, Weisbach (1988) finds that CARs are marginally positive 
for a sample of 269 CEO resignations.  The positive mean result is largely driven by the 
subsample of firms with outsider dominated boards.  Evidence of positive mean stock 
price reactions for a sample of CEO departures that are likely to be firm-initiated is 
consistent with the hypothesis that positive private information is revealed when the 
CEO resigns.   
More recently, Jenter and Kanaan (2008) examine a recent sample of forced CEO 
departures, and find that stock price reactions to CEO dismissals are negative.  This 
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suggests that at the mean, the market receives new and unfavorable information 
regarding firm value at the forced departure announcement.  Chang, Dasgupta, and 
Hilary (2008) examine CEO departures, and find that the stock price reaction to the 
departure announcement is negatively related to the firm’s past performance, and to the 
future career progress of the executive.  These results are generally consistent with the 
hypothesis that when managers with good performance leave unexpectedly, the 
departure announcement is a negative surprise.  This is an alternative reason why stock 
price reactions to CEO departures may be negative; and it is therefore important to 
distinguish between forced departures and other unexpected CEO departures that may 
have negative value implications for entirely different reasons.       
 In summary, the empirical evidence focusing on mean announcement returns is 
mixed.  Earlier studies that focus on CEO and other top executive departures that are 
described as forced, or are more likely to be forced, generally find mean abnormal 
returns are positive; however Warner Watts, and Wruck (1988) find that mean returns 
are not significantly different from zero; and Jenter and Kanaan's more recent study finds 
negative mean abnormal returns.   
 2.2 Empirical approach 
 The existing literature does control for firms’ self selection into the turnover 
sample by making a distinction between forced and voluntary turnovers; however, 
private information in the self selection decision has not been examined in the cross-
section.  Because the focus of this study is revisions to investor's expectations, I examine 
CEO succession event announcement returns in the context of Prabhala’s (1997) 
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selection model.  This model assumes that firm decisions may be partially anticipated by 
the market prior to the announcement event based upon publicly available information.  
To the extent that value-relevant decisions are not fully expected ex ante, corporate 
decision announcements reveal new information to the market.  Li and Prabhala (2007) 
extend the discussion of the self selection decision in event studies, arguing that the use 
of a Heckman two step procedure that includes a non-selection hazard in the outcome 
equation can be interpreted as a test for private information.   
 When the announcement of a forced CEO departure is made, it may reveal 
several things.  The first piece of information is the board's assessment that the value 
contribution of the incumbent is lower than that of the expected replacement, net of 
turnover costs.   Additionally, it is possible that the forced departure announcement 
reveals private information about internal governance strength; in particular, the board's 
ability or willingness to act on information and force out a low-value CEO.  The 
combined effect of these two possible private information components is expected to be 
positively related to abnormal returns.   
 Creating the proxy for private information in the CEO departure decision 
involves first estimating predicted probabilities of CEO departures based upon 
characteristics of the incumbent CEO, firm, and industry.  The predicted probabilities are 
then used to estimate the inverse Mills' ratio, or non-selection hazard.  This is an inverse, 
non-linear transform of the predicted probability of CEO departure.  For the subsample 
of firms self-selecting into a given event, in this case forced CEO replacement, the non-
selection hazard is equivalent to the model residual, and is defined as the probability 
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distribution function evaluated at the predicted probability, divided by the cumulative 
distribution function evaluated at the predicted probability.  As the predicted 
probabilities approach 1, the non-selection hazard approaches zero.   
 In the second step, the non-selection hazard enters the cross-sectional abnormal 
return regression as a covariate.  The test of the relation between the departure 
announcement abnormal return and private information in the departure decision is the 
test for significance of the non-selection hazard in the outcome equation. There are two 
alternative selection models used to estimate the proxy for private information.  The first 
estimates the probability of forced CEO departure assuming that the alternative outcome 
is "no turnover."   CEO turnover events that are not classified as forced are dropped from 
the sample.  This approach ignores information revealed to the market by the firm's 
choice of a forced departure rather than a voluntary departure.  Therefore, I also estimate 
a selection equation that produces a non-selection hazard  based on selection of  forced 
departure rather than voluntary CEO departure, conditional on a turnover occurring.    
 Neither of these two approaches controls for the full range of choice outcomes 
that firms face.  In order to assess possible differences in predictions based upon models 
with binary choice outcomes, and predictions based upon models that allow for multiple 
choice outcomes, I compare results of multinomial selection models to binomial models 
before presenting second stage regression results.   The multinomial regression includes 
planned departures, unplanned voluntary departures, and forced CEO departures; these 
are compared to the no turnover reference category.   
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 Examination of determinants of alternative CEO turnover choices is important 
because the proxy for private information is based upon the extent to which a particular 
CEO departure choice is not predicted or explained based upon publicly available 
information, and binomial models do not incorporate information about alternative CEO 
departure types that the firm did not choose.  Results of the multinomial model are also 
helpful in understanding differences between the voluntary and involuntary successions 
that are used in the models of selection into the forced turnover sample conditional on a 
CEO turnover event occurring.  More detailed discussion of planned, unplanned 
voluntary, and forced CEO departures are presented in section 4 below. 
 I also partition the forced CEO replacement sample based on the timing of CEO 
departure and appointment announcements.  In the existing literature, none of the studies 
focusing on CEO departure announcement abnormal returns controls for departure 
announcements in which the successor is announced on the same day as the departure of 
the incumbent, and those that are announced separately from the appointment of the 
successor.
5
    This may influence results because a forced CEO departure announcement 
implies that the firm has committed to replacing the CEO, but does not always reveal the 
replacement CEO simultaneously.  In cases where release of information about the 
replacement CEO is delayed, greater uncertainty may remain with regards to the net 
benefits of replacement and private information revealed in the announcement may be of 
higher importance. 
                                                 
5
 Reinganum (1985) focuses on executive appointment announcements and does control for same day 
announcements. 
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3.  DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
PRIVATE INFORMATION IN CEO REPLACEMENT DECISIONS 
 
To generate the sample, I identify CEO turnover events in the fiscal years 1997-
2005 in Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database.   Information on CEO departure 
circumstances is obtained from a search of Lexis-Nexis news announcements related to 
the turnover, and proxy statements.  Based on the news announcements and proxy 
statement data, I identify announcement dates for the announcement of the incumbent 
CEO's departure, and the announcement of the successor CEO's appointment.  
I identify firms that have a succession plan in place prior to the departure 
announcement, departures caused by death or poor health, departures in which the 
outgoing CEO was hired away, and forced departures.  CEO successions are classified as 
planned if news announcements indicate that the succession is planned, or if the 
successor is announced at least 6 months before the announcement of the incumbent 
CEO's departure.    CEO departures are classified as forced if they are described as 
forced in news announcements.  CEO departures that are not described as forced may be 
classified as such based upon Parrino's (1997) method of identifying firm-initiated CEO 
departures:  (1) the departure was not announced at least 6 months in advance, (2), the 
departing CEO does not leave for reasons related to health, death, or to accept another 
position elsewhere, and (3) the departing CEO is under the age of 60 and therefore less 
likely to be retiring.  CEO successions that are not classified as planned or forced are 
included in the unplanned voluntary category.  CEOs who are described as interim 
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appointments are excluded from the sample.  CEO turnovers that occur because of poor 
health or death, because of mergers, or having the incumbent CEO hired away by 
another firm are also excluded from the sample.   
Accounting data are obtained from the Compustat Annual data base. Stock price 
data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).   I obtain governance 
data from RiskMetrics.  After merging the turnover data with data from Execucomp, 
Compustat, RiskMetrics and CRSP, and eliminating observations with missing data, a 
sample of 1,129 CEO succession events remains.  The final sample consists of 449 
planned successions, 324 unplanned voluntary successions, and 356 forced CEO 
departures.    
Variables included in the analysis are those that existing literature has shown 
relevant to CEO departure decisions, and can generally be categorized as measuring 
CEO, firm, industry, and market characteristics.  All variables that are expressed as 
dollar values are inflation adjusted to constant 2005 dollars.  Industry averages and 
medians with the exception of the industry homogeneity proxy are based upon the full 
Compustat universe of firms, and are matched to the sample firms by 3 digit SIC code 
and year.  Discussion of the significance of these variables in CEO departure equations 
is presented in Section 4.    
 Using data from Execucomp, news announcements, and proxy statements, I 
determine the age and tenure of the incumbent CEO.  CEO age tends to be positively 
related to the likelihood that a CEO will retire from the CEO position, and is therefore a 
strong predictor of voluntary CEO departures.  CEO tenure may capture entrenchment of 
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the CEO; but may also be positively correlated with the CEO’s experience or expertise 
that is valuable to the firm.  Total assets are a measure of firm size.  Firm size is not a 
common covariate in CEO departure analyses.  This is included based on empirical 
evidence that firm size affects the marginal product of CEO effort (Rajan and Wulf, 
2006), or ability (Baker and Hall, 2004).    Larger firms may perceive relatively high net 
benefits of CEO replacement associated with marginal increases in CEO effort, ability, 
or match quality.  
Three year change in operating returns on assets (OROA) is included as a 
measure of  operating efficiency, it is defined as the difference between sales less 
operating expenses, divided by total assets in the year prior to the CEO departure, and 
the same measure three years prior to the CEO departure.   The operating performance 
measure is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, and is industry adjusted by 
subtracting three digit SIC code medians.   I control for stock price performance in the 
six months prior to the CEO departure announcement with market model buy and hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs).  In order to avoid an overlap of the announcement period 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) estimation period with the stock price performance 
measure, we use an estimation period that ends in the seventh month prior to the CEO 
departure announcement for both the six month BHAR and the announcement period 
CAR for the CEO turnover firm years.  For non-CEO turnover firm years, the buy and 
hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are calculated for months June-November of the prior 
fiscal year.   Buy and hold abnormal returns are also winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles.   
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I replicate Parrino’s (1997) proxy for industry homogeneity in order to control 
for the precision of signals received from relative performance measures
6
.  The proxy for 
industry homogeneity is based upon CRSP data.  In this case industry classifications are 
based upon 2 digit SIC codes, and the homogeneity proxy is matched to the sample 
based on 2 digit SIC code and year.  The industry homogeneity proxy captures the 
proportion of variation in monthly stock prices that is explained by two digit industry 
stock price variation.  Industries that are more homogeneous are those whose individual 
firm stock prices tend to move together with the industry average stock price.  This is 
assumed to be the result of more homogeneous production technology and product 
market characteristics within industry groupings.  In more homogenous industries, 
exogenous shocks are expected to have a more homogenous effect upon stock price 
performance of firms within the industry.  This results in more precise evaluations of 
relative performance.  While this proxy is based upon stock prices, the industry 
homogeneity it is intended to capture should in theory affect the relative precision of 
information derived from accounting performance measures as well as stock price 
performance. 
Following Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) I include industry average return on assets 
(ROA) as a determinant of CEO departures motivated by the demand for different skill 
sets during changing industry conditions.   
                                                 
6
 I follow Parrino’s (1997)  methodology in constructing this measure.  In particular, I calculate the 
homogeneity proxy only for industries that have at least 35 firms in the two digit SIC group.  For 
industries that have more than 50 firms, a random selection of 50 firms is chosen to calculate the 
homogeneity proxy. This ensures that variation in this variable is not significantly affected by the number 
of firms in the industry. 
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Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) provide evidence that industry profitability (ROA) is 
negatively related to both forced and voluntary CEO departures.  They theorize that 
changing industry conditions affect the value generated by the incumbent CEO.  The 
required CEO skill set changes in industry downturns, leading to increased forced CEO 
departures as firms seek to match to individuals who have the skills required to navigate 
changing industry conditions.  Value weighted buy and hold market returns are included 
to control for broader economic conditions.  These are based on the CRSP universe, and 
are estimated over the six months preceding the CEO departure announcement.  The 
analyses also include controls for firms operating in regulated industries.   Regulated 
industries include financial firms whose primary SIC codes are between 6000 and 6999, 
and utilities with primary SIC codes between 4900 and 4999.   
I include four board related variables.  These are all based on RiskMetric’s board 
and governance data, and are measured in the fiscal year prior to the CEO departure 
announcement.  The first is the percentage of independent directors on the board.  This is 
intended to control for the board’s bargaining position with the CEO.7  Second is the 
average age of board members; this is included as a control for board members’ career 
concerns.   Older board members may be less concerned with their reputations as they 
have less time left to acquire additional board seats, and fewer years to retain existing 
board memberships.    An indicator that the board is classified is used as a measure of 
                                                 
7
 See papers suggesting that independent boards provide stronger internal governance:  Choi, Park, and 
Yoo (2007), Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004), Ryan and Wiggins (2004), Klein, (2002),  Cotter, 
Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Beasley (1996), Weisbach (1988). 
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entrenchment that may stem from protection against the market for corporate control.
 8
  
Board size is included as an additional measure of board effectiveness.
9
     
                                                 
8
 Some recent papers indicate that board classification entrenches management:   Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2008),  Guo, Kruse, and Nohel (2008),  Faleye( 2007),  and Bebchuk, Coates and Subramnian 
(2002). 
9
 See Yermack (1996), and Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) for empirical evidence related to board 
size and board effectiveness. 
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4.  DETERMINANTS OF CEO REPLACEMENTS 
 
Tables of empirical results related to the analysis of private information in forced 
CEO replacement decisions are presented in Appendix A  These tables are identified as 
Tables A-1 through A-11, and are referenced in the discussion below by these 
designations.   
4.1 CEO departure types 
Summary statistics of alternative CEO departure outcomes and CEO, firm, board, 
and industry characteristics are presented in Table A-1.   
4.1.1. Planned successions 
 Planned successions account for 39.77% of the CEO turnover sample.  Most 
planned successions can be described as planned retirements.  Many firms begin 
planning the succession years in advance of the CEO's expected retirement.  Evidence 
from news announcements indicates that planned successions may be announced as early 
as three years prior to a CEO's actual departure.   It is more common for succession 
plans to be publicly announced in the year prior to the turnover.   
Generally, at the time the succession plan is announced, the CEO elect is given 
increased responsibilities.  CEO elects are often given complete responsibility for 
overseeing the firm’s day to day operations at the time the succession plan is announced, 
as well as increased exposure to the media and analysts covering the firm.  Because this 
transition period is observable by the market, information regarding the CEO-elect’s 
expected value contributions will slowly be incorporated into stock prices during the 
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transition period.  Consequently, it is likely that relatively little private information is 
revealed when planned CEO departures are announced.     
4.1.2. Unplanned voluntary successions 
 Unplanned voluntary successions include all CEO departures that cannot be 
classified as either planned succession or forced departures using publicly available data. 
Unplanned voluntary departures make up 28.70% of the CEO turnover sample.    It is 
possible that some CEO departures that are actually forced are not correctly categorized 
as such.   These may be included in the unplanned voluntary category.  Untabulated tests 
for differences of means and medians show that operating and stock price performance 
measures are lower in the unplanned voluntary sample than they are in the planned 
succession subsample.  It is therefore likely that some of the departures that are 
classified as unplanned voluntary may have been initiated by boards in response to poor 
performance.  However, the mean age for CEOs departing in unplanned voluntary 
successions (62.12 years) is very similar to that of CEOs departing in planned 
successions (62.10 years); and it is therefore probable that a significant portion of these 
departures truly are retirements without succession plans.  These departures may have 
been anticipated by the market based on the incumbent CEO’s advancing age.   
4.1.3 Forced CEO departures 
  Approximately 32% of the CEO succession sample is made up of forced CEO 
departures.  The mean age for CEOs who are forced out is 54.49 years.  Because the 
forced departures are announced suddenly, and usually involve CEOs who are under 
normal retirement age, these are more likely to reveal new information to external 
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investors.  Additionally, both operating and stock price performance measures are lowest 
in the forced CEO departure subsample.   Forced CEO departure announcements are 
therefore more likely to be associated with revisions to investor’s expectations of forced 
CEO departure probabilities, net benefits of CEO replacement, and the firm’s internal 
governance effectiveness.    
4.2 Multinomial and binomial analysis of CEO succession decisions 
 This section presents multivariate analysis of CEO departure determinants for the 
planned, unplanned and involuntary succession samples. As I discuss earlier, an 
understanding of publicly available information that is significantly related to CEO 
departure outcomes is important when the non-selection hazard is interpreted as a proxy 
for private information.  Furthermore, when implementing the Heckman procedure to 
analyze information effects in forced CEO departure announcement abnormal returns, 
there are a number of possible model specifications.  The Heckman procedure allows for 
a binomial selection model, but in reality there are more than two CEO 
departure/retention alternatives.  In order to compare forced CEO departures to one 
single alternative choice, voluntary CEO departures may be dropped from the sample, 
included in the "no turnover" sample, or defined as the alternative outcome after deleting 
firm years in which no turnover occurred.  Therefore, I present alternative specifications 
of CEO departure outcomes, in order to assess the validity of different empirical 
approaches and the robustness of our results. 
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4.2.1 Multinomial analysis of planned, unplanned voluntary, and forced CEO     
         successions 
 Table A-2 presents estimated coefficients of a multinomial logit regression of 
alternative succession decisions versus a “no turnover” reference category.  Standard 
errors are robust, and are adjusted for clusters in 3 digit SIC codes.  The age of the 
incumbent CEO is significantly positively related to the likelihood that the firm will 
choose a planned succession or unplanned voluntary succession rather than retaining the 
CEO for an additional year.  This is consistent with the assertion that the majority of the 
voluntary successions are retirements.  CEO age is unrelated to the likelihood of forced 
succession being chosen over the no turnover alternative.   
CEO tenure is unrelated to the planned succession outcome, and negatively 
related to the choice of an unplanned voluntary or forced turnover occurring rather than 
the no turnover alternative.  These results related to age and tenure are generally 
consistent with existing evidence.  The negative relation between forced CEO departure 
and CEO tenure may be explained by CEO entrenchment, as longer-tenured CEOs 
become more powerful and difficult to oust.
 10
  It may also be explained by the fact that 
CEOs who are poor matches to the firm are identified and dismissed earlier in their 
tenure.
 11
  
  
                                                 
10
 See Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) for theoretical analysis of this. 
11
 Allgood and Farrell (2003)  provide related empirical evidence. 
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The natural log of total assets is significantly positively related to the choice of a 
planned succession; and is not related to the likelihood of unplanned voluntary or forced 
CEO departures being chosen over the no turnover reference category.  The positive 
relation between firm size and the likelihood of choosing a planned succession rather 
than the no turnover alternative may caused in part by the fact that larger firms tend to 
appoint older and more experience individuals to the CEO position.  The insignificant 
relation between firm size and forced CEO departures does not provide evidence 
consistent with the prediction that larger firms have higher incentives to replace 
underperforming CEOs due to higher marginal product of CEO effort, ability, or match 
quality.   
 Industry adjusted three year change in operating ROA and six month market 
model BHARs are unrelated to the choice of planned CEO departures and unplanned 
voluntary CEO departures.  The likelihood of forced CEO departure is negatively related 
to both the industry adjusted operating ROA and lagged six month BHARs.   This is 
consistent with prior evidence suggesting that CEOs are more likely to be fired 
following poor performance.  
Following Parrino (1997) I include a proxy for industry homogeneity to control 
for the relative precisions of relative performance evaluation.  The proxy for industry 
homogeneity is not significantly related to the likelihood of any CEO departure type 
being chosen over the no turnover alternative outcome.  This is not consistent with 
Parrino’s (1997) earlier findings based on a sample of turnovers in Forbes 500 firms.  
Our time period is much later than Parrino’s, and our CEO turnover sample is based on 
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firms in the S&P 1500.  It is possible that over time, alternative factors affecting forced 
CEO departures have become more important.   
Following Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010), I include industry average ROA to 
control for industry conditions.  I do not find a significant relation between industry 
average ROA and the likelihood of planned, unplanned voluntary or forced CEO 
departures. There is, however, find a significant negative relation between six month 
market buy and hold returns and any CEO departure type being chosen over the no 
turnover alternative.  This result is generally consistent with the existing literature and 
may be due to firm’s need to match to different CEO skill sets during market downturns, 
or the unwillingness of incumbent CEOs to remain in office during tough times.  Being 
in a regulated industry is negatively related to the likelihood that the firm will choose an 
unplanned voluntary departure or forced CEO departure rather than the no turnover 
alternative.  Industry regulation is unrelated to the choice of planned CEO departures.   
The percentage of independent directors is positively related to the likelihood of 
planned CEO departures, and is not significantly unrelated to unplanned voluntary and 
forced CEO departures.    This dataset extends beyond the introduction of new 
legislation related to board independence; and may therefore have reduced variation in 
board independence in the later part of our sample period.  It is also possible that over 
time more independent boards have enacted stronger guidelines for planning CEO 
successions; this may also contribute to the lack of significance of board independence 
in the choice of forced CEO departures rather than the no turnover alternative.  Because 
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there are no earlier studies focusing on board independence and succession planning, this 
result cannot be directly compared with existing evidence. 
Board age is negatively related to the likelihood of any type of CEO departure 
occurring.   This may be due to the fact that older boards have fewer reputation and 
career concerns; and therefore do not concern themselves with CEO departures in 
general.  It is also possible that older boards are more experienced, do a better job of 
appointing, advising, and monitoring; and as a result implement fewer CEO turnovers of 
any kind.   
Board size is positively related to the likelihood of planned successions 
occurring, but not the likelihood of unplanned voluntary or forced CEO departures.  This 
result is generally not consistent with earlier evidence showing that smaller boards are 
more effective monitors than larger boards.  Board size may capture some aspect of the 
complexity of the firm’s operations that is not explained by the proxy for firm size. 12   
This operational complexity may require the appointment of older, more experienced 
CEOs who are closer to retirement age, and subsequently result in more frequent 
planned successions.  Firms with classified boards are more likely to implement planned 
CEO successions, rather than retaining the incumbent CEO for an additional year.  This 
result is not consistent with evidence from earlier time periods, suggesting that board 
classification may protect inferior managers from being forced out (Dezso, 2007; Faleye 
2007).   
                                                 
12
 See Coles Daniel and Naveen (2008)  for evidence that larger and more diversified firms benefit from 
having larger boards. 
 33 
In summary, I find that forced CEO departures are more likely to occur earlier in 
a CEO’s tenure, when operating and stock price performance are poor, in unregulated 
industries, and when market returns are lower.  These results are generally consistent 
with existing empirical evidence. I also find that the likelihood of forced CEO departures 
is not significantly related to a proxy for industry homogeneity, board independence, 
size, and classifications status, but it is negatively related to the average age of board 
members.  These results are somewhat different from existing empirical evidence. 
4.2.2 Binomial logit analysis of planned, unplanned voluntary, and forced CEO  
          successions  
 Table A-3 presents results of binomial logit regressions for planned, unplanned 
voluntary and forced CEO successions compared to the no turnover reference category.  
In each case, alternative CEO departure types are dropped.  In presenting these results, I 
am primarily interested in differences between the binomial model estimates, and 
multinomial regression estimate that are discussed in section 4.2.1 above.  Robust 
standard errors are adjusted for clusters in two digit SIC codes.  Results for forced CEO 
departures based on a binomial logit are very close to those produced by the multinomial 
logit.  Variables that are significant in the multinomial model are also significant in the 
binomial logit regressions, and the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are 
very similar. 
 34 
4.2.3 Binomial probit analysis of planned, unplanned voluntary, and forced CEO  
          successions  
 This section presents a comparison of binomial probit regression results to those 
of the binomial logit regressions.  Binomial probit results are presented in Table A-4.  In 
the forced CEO departure regression, the estimated coefficients for six month market 
model BHARs and the six month market buy and hold return in the probit model are less 
than half as large in magnitude as the logit estimates for these variables.  Probit 
estimates for coefficients of CEO tenure, operating performance, and board age are also 
smaller in magnitude than those of the logit models.   
 In brief, when I compare the binomial probit regression results to binomial logit 
models, there are some differences in the magnitude of estimated coefficients.   The 
estimated coefficients are very similar in terms of magnitude when we compare the 
multinomial logit to binomial logit.  In general, I conclude that ignoring information 
included in voluntary CEO departures does not appear to significantly affect the relation 
between forced CEO departure likelihoods and CEO characteristics, firm size, 
performance, industry average profitability, and board characteristics.  Significant 
differences between the first stage probit of the Heckman models and the multinomial 
estimates is largely driven by differences between the probit and logit specification, and 
not by differences between multinomial and binomial specifications. 
4.2.4 Logit and probit regressions of involuntary versus voluntary succession outcomes 
 Table A-5 presents results of logit and probit regressions estimating the 
likelihood of a forced succession occurring rather than a voluntary succession, 
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conditional on a turnover occurring.  The results indicate that relatively few variables are 
significantly related to the choice of forced departure in this specification.  For both 
models, the age and tenure of the incumbent CEO are negatively related to the likelihood 
of choosing a forced departure rather than voluntary departure.  Firm operating and stock 
price performance, and market returns are also negatively related to the likelihood of 
choosing a forced CEO departure.  Probit estimates of coefficients for all these variables 
are smaller in magnitude than the logit estimates.  Interestingly, though relatively few 
variables are related to the choice of forced departure when compared to the voluntary 
departure alternative, the pseudo r-squares in the forced vs. voluntary specifications are 
slightly over 0.30, compared to 0.06-0.10 for CEO departure specifications that include a 
no turnover reference category.   Based on the covariates included in the regressions, it is 
easier to predict what kind of CEO departure occurs, than it is to predict whether a CEO 
departure will occur or not. 
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5.  THE RELATION BETWEEN THE PROXY FOR PRIVATE INFORMATION 
AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS AT THE CEO DEPARTURE 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
  This section presents summary statistics of cumulative abnormal returns around 
CEO departure announcements, as well as abnormal return regression results from the 
second stage of Heckman selection models that is used to estimate the proxy for private 
information used by the board in forced CEO departure decisions.   
5.1 Cumulative abnormal return summary statistics 
 Table A-6 presents mean and median CARs for planned, unplanned voluntary, 
and forced CEO departure announcements.   In order to test differences from zero at the 
mean, the CARs are standardized; however the means and medians show in the table are 
not standardized.  Abnormal returns presented in Table A-6 are based on a value 
weighted market model, and are estimated over a two day window (0, 1).  The 
estimation period for the CARs ends in the seventh month prior to the departure 
announcement.  This ensures that the estimation period does not overlap with the firm 
six month buy and hold abnormal return performance measure that is included in the 
regressions. 
 As I discuss in Section 2, in planned successions the identity of the successor and 
the beginning of the transition period are known prior to the announcement of the 
incumbent CEO's departure.  Consequently, the incumbent CEO's departure 
announcement is not likely to be a surprise, or to convey economically significant 
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private information to the market.  Consistent with this, I find that mean CARs for the 
planned succession subsample are not significantly different from zero. 
A significant portion of the unplanned voluntary CEO successions are also likely 
to be retirements, so it is also not surprising that the abnormal returns in the voluntary 
departure subsamples are not significantly different from zero at the mean.  For 
unplanned voluntary successions, I consider subsamples of 258 CEO departure 
announcements that are made on the same day as the successor CEO's appointment 
announcement separately from the 66 unplanned voluntary CEO departure 
announcements that occur without an accompanying replacement CEO appointment 
announcement.  In these cases, the successor's appointment announcement is separated 
from the departure announcement by at least two calendar days.   While abnormal 
returns do not differ significantly from zero in either of these subsamples, the mean 
abnormal return is nominally negative in the same day announcement sample, and 
nominally positive in the sample of 66 unplanned voluntary departures with sequential 
announcements.  This difference is not statistically significant.  These two subsamples 
do differ in terms of their variance.   The subsample with separate announcement dates 
has significantly higher standard deviation of cumulative abnormal returns than the same 
day announcement sample does.   
 Mean abnormal returns for the sample of 356 forced CEO departure 
announcements are negative, but are not significantly different from zero at conventional 
significance levels.  Two different partitions of the forced departure sample are 
presented.  The first partition separates the forced departures into those with same day 
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announcements of the CEO departure and appointment, and those with sequential 
announcements.  Mean abnormal returns do not differ significantly from zero in the 
subsample of 187 forced CEO departures with same day replacement.  Mean CARS are 
significantly negative in the sample of 169 forced CEO departures with separate 
announcements of the replacement CEO.   The negative mean CAR for forced CEO 
departures with separate replacement announcements suggests that investors may be 
skeptical about net replacement benefits until the replacement CEO is actually 
announced. 
Furthermore, the sample of forced departures with same day successor 
appointment has significantly lower abnormal return variance than the sample in which 
departure announcement is made separately from the appointment announcement.  Thus, 
in both the unplanned voluntary and forced CEO departure samples with separate 
replacement CEO announcements, there is greater variation in the stock price reaction to 
the announcement. 
 The second partition of the forced departure sample is based on the proxy for 
private information.  I partition the sample into those with high private information 
content (above median inverse Mill’s ratio), and those with low (below median inverse 
Mill’s ratio) private information content.  The inverse Mills ratio is based on selection of 
a forced turnover rather than the no turnover reference category.  Mean abnormal returns 
are negative but not significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels 
in the high information content subsample.  Mean abnormal returns are significantly 
negative in the low information content subsample.  The significant difference in the 
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mean return between the high and low private information content subsamples suggests 
that the private information revealed in forced CEO departure announcements has a 
significantly positive effect on stock price reactions.   
 Variance of the abnormal returns for departure announcements with high private 
information content is significantly higher than abnormal return variance in the low 
private information content sample.  The differences in the mean and variance of CEO 
departure announcement abnormal returns for different subsamples of the forced CEO 
departures cut on high and low private information are similar to the difference in 
variance that we find when cutting the sample on separate announcement dates.   
Untabulated results show that in the subsample of 178 low private information forced 
CEO departures; there are approximately 52% that have separate announcement dates.  
Therefore, it does not seem that the negative mean CAR and higher variance in the low 
private information sample are primarily driven by a large percentage of CEO departures 
with separate announcement dates within this subsample. 
Table A-7 presents univariate correlations (Panel A) and univariate regressions 
(Panel B) of cumulative abnormal returns on the proxy for private information.   The 
proxy for private information used in these univariate analyses is based on selection of 
forced CEO turnover versus a no turnover alternative.  For these statistics, I include 
three alternative abnormal return windows: (0, 0), (0, 1), and (-1, 1).  For forced CEO 
departures, the univariate correlation between the CAR and the proxy for private 
information is significantly positive for all three window specifications, and ranges from 
0.100 to 0.121, with p-values ranging from 0.023 to 0.059.  This compares to univariate 
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correlations between planned and unplanned voluntary CEO departures announcement 
CARs and the proxy for private information that are negative but not significantly 
different from zero at conventional levels.     
I also estimate univariate OLS regressions with an intercept for the subsample of 
forced CEO departures.  These are presented in Panel B of Table A7.  In the univariate 
regressions of the alternative abnormal returns on the proxy for private information, the 
estimated coefficients are smaller than the univariate correlations, ranging from 0.021 to 
0.046.  These are statistically significant, with p-values ranging from 0.044 to 0.062.   
The adjusted r-squares from these OLS models range from 0.006 to 0.009.  The 
estimates based on a (0, 1) abnormal return window are the largest in magnitude and 
have the highest statistical significance levels.  In subsequent sections, the second stage 
of Heckman results are all based upon the (0, 1) CAR window.   
I also include a correlation matrix for all variables of interest including control 
variables in Table A-8.  The correlations show that the proxy for private information is 
in some cases significantly correlated with other covariates included in the second stage 
CAR regressions.  The proxy for private information is most highly correlated with the 
firm buy and hold abnormal stock return in the six months prior to the CEO’s departure, 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.559.  
5.2 Multivariate analysis of the relation between the proxy for private information and  
      CEO departure announcement abnormal returns 
 This section presents results of second stage regressions of cumulative abnormal 
returns, controlling for the private information revealed by the firm's selection into the 
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CEO succession sample.  The primary variable of interest in these regressions is the non-
selection hazard; the economic interpretation of this is based on Prabhala (1997), and Li 
and Prabhala’s (2006) discussion of the non-selection hazard as a proxy for private 
information in corporate decisions.  By construction, the non-selection hazard is a non-
linear inverse function of the predicted probability of CEO succession; it measures the 
extent to which the CEO succession decision is not predicted based upon publicly 
available data that we include in the selection equation.   The Heckman regressions are 
estimated using maximum likelihood; the results do not change significantly if two step 
estimation is used.  Robust standard errors are clustered by three digit SIC code.   
 Using the Heckman two stage selection model, I first estimate the private 
information proxy based on selection into the turnover sample versus the no turnover 
alternative.  An additional model estimates the effects of private information revealed in 
involuntary CEO departure announcements, conditional on a CEO succession event 
occurring.  Alternative specifications control for same day announcement of CEO 
departure and the successor's appointment, and CEO departure announcements that are 
made without immediate replacement.   
5.2.1 Private information in the full sample of CEO departures 
 The first three columns of Table A-9 present results of CAR regressions that 
include the inverse Mill’s ratio based upon selection into the CEO succession sample 
versus the no turnover alternative.  In these models, only one turnover type is retained.  
Turnover firm years are compared to the firm years with no turnovers, while alternative 
CEO succession events are dropped from the sample.  The fourth column of Table A-9 
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presents second stage Heckman results for the specification comparing forced CEO 
departures to the voluntary departure alternative.   
 CAR regression results for voluntary CEO successions are presented along with 
forced CEO departures, in order to compare information effects of forced CEO 
departures to these that are planned, or unplanned but voluntary.  As expected, the 
estimated relation between the non-selection hazard and abnormal returns is not 
statistically significant in the regressions for the planned and unplanned voluntary 
departure subsamples.   
In the forced CEO departure sample, the relation between the proxy for private 
information and the CAR is significantly positive.  When the selection model is based on 
the no turnover alternative, I find that the estimated coefficient on the proxy for private 
information is 0.078, with a p-value of 0.000.  This is similar to the estimated coefficient 
that obtained in the univariate OLS regression, and indicates that the positive relation 
between the CAR and the proxy for private information is not significantly affected by  
multicollinearity with covariates that are significant in the selection equation.  A very 
similar result holds if I include voluntary CEO departures together with no turnover firm 
years in the reference category, and proxy for private information in the choice of a 
forced turnover rather than “voluntary or no turnover.”   These results are not tabulated.    
In these specifications, measures of firm operating and stock price performance 
are significantly negatively related to the forced departure announcement CAR.  This is 
also consistent with the prediction that external market participants underestimate forced 
CEO departure probabilities conditional on observed relative performance measures.  
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Outsiders can observe the performance measures but still underestimate forced CEO 
departure probabilities, either because they underestimate the ability of a replacement 
CEO to do better, or because they underestimate the firm’s governance strength.  At the 
forced CEO departure announcement, external market participants update expectations 
of firm value in response to the information that the CEO is actually being replaced.  
This leads to a higher CAR for firms that had lower performance measures prior to the 
forced departure announcement. 
When I estimate the proxy for private information based on selection of a forced 
CEO departure rather than a voluntary departure reference category, the estimated 
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio in the CAR regression is 0.078, with a p-value of 
0.000.  In this specification, the market model BHAR in the 6 months prior to the CEO 
departure remains negatively related to the CAR, but the estimated coefficient for 
operating ROA is not significantly different from zero.  The estimated coefficient for the 
age of the incumbent CEO is also significantly negatively related to the CAR when 
selection is based on a forced rather than voluntary CEO departure.  When older CEOs 
depart it is more likely that their departures will be described as “retirements;” thus the 
announcement of a forced departure for older CEOs is apt to be more of a surprise.  The 
fact that this estimated coefficient is negative may be because external investors believe 
that older CEOs will only be forced out if their contributions to firm value are very bad; 
therefore the firing of an older CEO may provide a signal that things are even worse at 
the firm than had been indicated by relative performance measures. 
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The results of these CAR regressions are generally consistent with the hypothesis 
that the private information revealed in forced CEO departure announcements is good 
news related to better than expected internal governance strength or net benefits of 
replacing the CEO.  It is interesting that this result remains after controlling for variables 
related to board independence, size, age, and classified structure, and that none of the 
board variables is significant in the CAR regressions.    It is possible that variables 
related to board structure and composition are less informative signals of governance 
strength now than they were in the past.  Since recent regulations have imposed more 
conformity on observable board characteristics, these may be less informative to outside 
investors.  Under these circumstances, the actions taken by the board may provide an 
additional signal of the boards’ ability and willingness to forcibly replace the CEO.   
5.2.2 Alternative model specifications 
 Because the validity of the proxy for private information depends entirely upon 
the specification of the selection equation, I estimate alternative models for the selection 
equation and CAR regression in order to assess the robustness of the results.  These are 
not tabulated.  Inclusion of additional or alternative firm and industry level variables in 
some cases results in higher multicollinearity between the covariates in the outcome 
equation, or reduces the sample size significantly.  Therefore, I focus on the robustness 
of the univariate relation between the proxy for private information and the CAR in 
these robustness checks.    
One alternative model substitutes a measure of industry adjusted operating 
performance in the year prior to the CEO departure for the stock price performance 
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measure.   In other specifications, I include lagged measures of firm focus, three year 
asset growth rates, or capital expenditures scaled by sales in order to control for non-
performance related firm characteristics that might influence CEO departures in some 
way.  These non-performance related variables are in some cases significantly related to 
the selection decision, but do not significantly affect the positive relation between the 
inverse Mills ratio and the CAR.   
One additional firm characteristic that I attempt to find a proxy for is the 
importance of human capital in the firm’s production technology.  Firms that use a 
production technology that relies more heavily upon human capital may differ from 
firms employing more physical capital in that 1) managers and all employees may have 
higher bargaining power relative those who monitor them, and 2) their actual activities 
and performance may be more opaque to both the board and external market 
participants.
13
  Several alternative measures of the importance of human resources in the 
production technology are included:  I scale labor and related expenses (Compustat 
variable XLR) by cost of goods sold (COGS), total assets (AT), or operating expenses 
(XOPR).  In some specifications the proxy for the importance of human resources in the 
production technology is negatively related to the likelihood of a forced CEO departure 
occurring; however, the positive univariate relation between the proxy for private 
information and the CEO departure announcement CAR remains statistically significant.   
  
                                                 
13
 One example of a group of firms that relies more heavily upon human capital in the production 
technology includes those operating in the financial services industry.   
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I also estimate regressions that include additional industry level variables related 
to asset growth, merger activity, and industry concentration.  Two alternative measures 
of industry merger activity are used.  The first is based upon the percent of firms in the 3 
digit SIC industry group that delist due to mergers in the three years prior to the current 
year or year of the CEO’s departure, using CRSP delisting codes to identify merger 
related delistings.  The second is based upon the percentage of firms reporting that sales 
have been affected by merger accounting (as indicated in a footnote to sales) in the three 
years prior to the current year or year of the CEO’s departure.14   
The measure of industry concentration is based upon U.S. Census Bureau data 
industry concentration ratios
15
.  Because the Census Bureau data includes Herfindahl 
Index concentration ratios based on all firms in the industry for manufacturing 
industries, but does not present the same ratio for firms operating in service, financial, 
retail, utility, and other industry groups, I estimate an aggregate measure of industry 
concentration based on the percentage of sales accounted for by the 4, 8, 20 and 50 
largest firms in the industry.  These sales percentages are included for all industry groups 
in the U.S. Census data with the exception of firms operating in mining industries.  The 
inclusion of any of these industry level variables in the regression equations does not 
significantly affect the positive univariate relation between the proxy for private 
information and the CAR.   
                                                 
14
 This measure of industry merger activity is based upon a proxy for industry acquisition activity 
suggested by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2007). 
15
 See Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2008) for analysis of the benefits of industry competition based upon U.S. 
Census Bureau data rather than Compustat data. 
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I also run models in which industry classifications for performance adjustments, 
industry means and medians, and clustering of standard errors are based upon two digit 
SIC industry classification.  This change also does not impact the relation between the 
proxy for private information and the CEO departure announcement CAR.  
5.2.3 Private information and announcement timing 
 This section presents results of Heckman second stage regressions with sample 
partitions based upon CEO departure announcement timing.  We consider two 
subsamples: forced CEO turnovers that are announced on the same day that the 
appointment of the successor is announced (same day announcement), and forced CEO 
departures that are announced without naming the successor on the same day (separate 
announcement).   
 Table A-10 presents univariate analysis of the relation between the CEO 
departure abnormal returns and the proxy for private information for 169 forced 
departures with separate announcement dates, and 187 forced departures with same day 
announcements.  Panel A presents univariate correlations between the CEO departure 
announcement CARs and the proxy for private information in forced CEO departures 
with estimates based on selection versus the no turnover alternative, and selection versus 
the voluntary departure alternative.  In both cases, the univariate correlation between the 
CAR and the proxy for private information is consistently significant and positive in the 
sample of forced departures with separate announcement dates, but not in the sample of 
forced departures with same day announcements.  In the same day announcement 
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subsample, the univariate relation between the CAR and the proxy for private 
information remains positive, but significance levels are lower.  
 Panel B of Table A-10 presents results of univariate OLS regressions of 
alternative window abnormal returns on the proxy for private information after 
eliminating observations with same day announcements.  When the proxy for private 
information is based on forced departure rather than the no turnover alternative, the 
estimated coefficients on the private information proxy across the (0, 0), (0, 1), and (-1, 
1) CAR windows range from 0.037 to 0.070; and the associated p-values range from 
0.027 to 0.067.     
 Panel B of Table A-10 also presents results of univariate OLS regressions of 
alternative window abnormal returns on the proxy for private information based on 
selection of forced CEO departure rather than voluntary CEO departure.  Again, 187 
CEO departures in which the successor CEO is announced on the same day that the 
incumbent CEO’s departure is announced are dropped from the analysis.  The estimated 
coefficient of the proxy for private information in these specifications ranges from 0.036 
to 0.055; with p-values ranging from 0.009 to 0.026.   
 Table A-11 presents the second stage results for Heckman regressions estimated 
after partitioning the sample based on same day and separate announcement of the 
successor CEO.  The first two columns of Table A-11 present results for forced CEO 
departures with separate and same day announcements based on selecting into one of 
these two groups versus the no turnover alternative.  The departure announcement CARs 
are positively related to the proxy for private information for both the subsample with 
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sequential announcements, and also for the subsample with same day announcements.   
When selection is based on the no turnover reference category, results based on the 
sample of CEO departure announcements with separate announcement of the successor 
show that the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills Ratio is 0.096 with a p-value of 
0.000.   For the subsample of forced departures with same day announcement, the 
estimated coefficient of the proxy for private information in the choice of a forced CEO 
departure rather than the no turnover alternative is 0.047, with a p-value of 0.057.   
I also split the sample based on same day and separate announcement of the 
successor CEO’s appointment and estimate the proxy for private information based on 
selection of forced CEO departure rather than voluntary departure.  In this case, the 
estimated relation between the proxy for private information and the departure 
announcement abnormal return also remains significantly positive for both the 
subsample with separate announcement dates; and the sample of forced departures with 
same day announcements.  In the separate day announcement subsample where the 
proxy for private information is based on selection of a forced rather than voluntary 
CEO departure, the estimated coefficient on the inverse Mill’s ratio is 0.120 with a p-
value of 0.000; while in the same day subsample the coefficient is 0.081 with a p-value 
of 0.000.   
Overall, results presented in Tables A-10 and A-11 suggest that the positive 
relation between the proxy for private information and the CEO departure announcement 
CAR is stronger when the successor CEO is not announced on the same day.  In the 
univariate analyses, the positive relation between the proxy for private information and 
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the CAR is weaker for forced CEO departures with same day announcement of the 
successor CEO, though a significant positive result still obtains in the multivariate 
regressions regardless of when the successor is announced.  Same day release of 
information related to both the departure of the incumbent and the appointment of the 
replacement CEO is associated with lower variation in stock returns at the 
announcement, resulting in decreased significance for some specifications of the relation 
between the CAR and the proxy for private information in the forced CEO departure 
decision.   
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6.  SUMMARY OF RESULTS RELATED TO PRIVATE INFORMATION USED 
BY BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN FORCED CEO DEPARTURE DECISIONS 
 
 I present empirical analysis of the nature of private information used by boards in 
forced CEO departure decisions that is revealed when forced CEO departures are 
announced.  Following Prabhala (1997), I estimate cross sectional abnormal return 
regressions that include a proxy for private information estimated using predicted 
probabilities from a first stage selection equation.  The non-selection hazard is used as a 
proxy for private information in the selection decision in abnormal return regressions, as 
suggested by Li and Prabhala (2006).    
I estimate two different proxies for private information in the forced departure 
decision.  The first is based upon the selection of a forced CEO departure rather than no 
turnover, and the second is based upon the selection of a forced departure rather than a 
voluntary departure.  In both cases, the positive relation between the proxy for private 
information and the abnormal announcement return is significantly positive in both 
univariate and multivariate tests.   
The relation between the forced CEO departure announcement abnormal return 
and the proxy for private information is significantly positive, and is robust to a number 
of different model specifications.  Alternative regression specifications control for the 
timing of the successor CEO's appointment announcement.   The positive relation 
between the private information revealed in the forced CEO departure announcement 
and the announcement abnormal return is stronger in CEO departure announcements that 
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are not accompanied by CEO replacement announcements.  When the involuntary CEO 
departure sample is partitioned based upon whether or not the replacement CEO was 
announced on the same day as the incumbent CEO's departure, the positive relation 
between abnormal returns and the private information proxy remains consistently 
positive.  In the subsample with same day announcement of the incumbent CEO's 
departure and the appointment of the successor, the positive relation between the 
abnormal return and the proxy for private information has lower statistical significance.  
These results suggest that the positive relation between departure returns and private 
information released in CEO departure announcements is stronger when news regarding 
the replacement CEO is not announced at the same time.   
 The empirical results provide evidence that external market participants do not 
have access to all the information used by the board in making forced CEO replacement 
decisions.  The evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that the market 
underestimates the probability that underperforming CEOs will be forced out.  Although 
increased expectations of forced departures may alleviate some of the downward 
pressure on stock prices as bad news about CEO performance is revealed and expected 
net benefits of CEO replacement rise, the information asymmetry between external 
investors and the board results in outsiders’ underestimating the likelihood of forced 
CEO departures.    
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7.  COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATING IN THE EXTERNAL 
MARKET FOR CEO TALENT 
 
 There is at present a limited body of academic literature related to executive 
labor markets that is relevant to corporate finance study of CEOs and other high level 
executives.  This stands in contrast to the significantly larger literature that deals with the 
activities, compensation, and governance of executives after they have achieved the 
CEO position.  Knowledge of how heterogeneous individuals are sorted into the CEO 
position at particular firms is relevant to the analysis of how these individuals are 
compensated
16
, monitored, and disciplined, and also to the analysis of how CEO 
heterogeneity affects corporate decisions and firm value.  Much of the existing work in 
corporate finance that is motivated by agency theory assumes that executives are 
homogenous with respect to ability, experience, and personality traits; and that it is 
variation in governance mechanisms that drives cross sectional variation in the CEO’s 
activities and subsequent value outcomes.  More recently, the assumption of CEO 
homogeneity has been relaxed.  Interpreting the relation between executive 
heterogeneity and corporate governance or corporate decisions may be significantly 
influenced by knowledge regarding the decisions, processes, and mechanisms that match 
individuals with heterogeneous experience, abilities, and personality traits to particular 
firms. 
                                                 
16
 A number of recent studies investigate issues related to competition for executive talent in external 
labor markets and executive compensation; these include Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000), Murphy and 
Zabojnik (2004, 2007),  Hubbard (2005), Cremers and Grinstein (2008), and  Gabaix and Landier (2008). 
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 Firms have two broad alternatives when it comes to choosing a new CEO:  
promoting an internal candidate, or hiring an outsider.  Internal and external CEO hires 
differ significantly in terms of the way they are matched to the hiring firm.  I present a 
framework that modifies Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm in order to integrate existing 
hypotheses related to the costs and benefits of transacting in the external market for CEO 
talent, rather than developing and promoting internal talent.   Because theories related to 
the costs and benefits of external hiring are both motivated by heterogeneity of the 
human resources being contracted, this approach provides a rationale for identifying 
subsamples of the data in which particular matching objectives matter more or less.   
7.1 External hiring costs 
The market for high level executive talent is not without frictions.  Matching 
heterogeneous individuals to heterogeneous firms in a situation of imperfect information 
involves significant search costs.
17
  The potential for bad matches increases the 
uncertainty related to contracting externally for both the firm and CEO candidate; and 
the possibility of severe negative wealth and reputation effects for both the executive and 
the firm suggests that conducting a less thorough search will not reduce external hiring 
costs on average.  Parrino (1997) finds evidence suggesting that search costs do affect 
firm decisions related to CEO successions in a sample of CEO turnover events occurring  
                                                 
17
 A large body of the economics literature deals with job search and matches, and search frictions in 
labor markets.  An incomplete list includes Jovanovic, (1979), Howitt and McAfee, (1987), Howitt, (1988), 
Andolfatto, (1996),  Moen, (1997), Coles and Smith, (1998),  Barlevy (2002), Matouschek and Ramezzana 
(2007),  and Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010).  For the most part this literature is not relevant to the 
study of the labor market for high level executives because the basic assumptions are directed towards 
the study of aggregate unemployment, the minimum wage, and other topics more relevant to welfare 
economics than to CEO succession decisions. 
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between 1969 and 1989.  Specifically, he finds evidence consistent with the prediction 
that when industries are more homogenous, firms are more likely to hire externally 
within the industry rather than promoting insiders. This supports the hypothesis that the 
skill sets and experience of executives within relatively homogenous industries are also 
more similar, leading to lower search costs for firms that transact in the external intra-
industry market for CEO talent. Intuitively, the higher homogeneity of human resources 
in more homogenous industries results from more similarity of the production 
technology and product markets of firms within the industry.   
In a more recent sample period, I do not find a statistically significant relation 
between the industry homogeneity proxy and the likelihood of an external intra-industry 
succession being chosen over an internal succession for the full turnover sample.  It is 
possible that increased activity in the external market for high level executive talent has 
led to a decrease in external hiring costs as more market infrastructure has been 
developed.  It is also possible that increases in the perceived benefits of hiring externally 
now outweigh the costs of doing so for a significant proportion of the sample firms. 
7.2 Benefits of participating in the external market for CEO talent 
 While Coase’s (1937) discussion focuses on the relative costs of external market 
transactions; much of the existing literature hypothesizes and finds evidence that firms 
choose external successions when the benefits of doing so are high.  Murphy and 
Zimmerman (1993), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Parrino (1997), Denis and Denis 
(1995), and Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001), Murphy and Zabojnik, (2004, 2007), 
Frydman (2007), and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) all find evidence that when the 
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potential for performance improvements is higher (firm performance measures are 
lower), firms are more likely to hire externally rather than promoting inside candidates.   
Both Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007), and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010)) refer to a 
“make or buy” decision that is driven by external hiring benefits.  The make versus buy 
choice is very much in the spirit of Coase’s theory of the firm; however none of the 
existing studies discusses the relation between costs and benefits of external CEO labor 
market participation.    
The reason that potential benefits of participating in the external labor market 
exist is because internal candidates may not have the same skills and experience that 
some external candidates have.  Coase’s emphasis on transaction costs assumes that 
resources and services exchanged in the external market are perfect substitutes for those 
that can be developed internally, and vice versa.  In the case of highly heterogeneous 
human resources, this is often not the case.  External candidates do not have firm 
specific knowledge and experience, and may not have industry specific knowledge.  
Internal candidates who hold more focused positions may not have the general 
management skills that some external candidates possess.  Internal candidates also may 
not have highly specific skills or experience needed to improve the firm’s performance 
or to design and implement strategic changes in response to changing external 
conditions.  Thus, individual heterogeneity provides incentives for firms to participate in 
the external market for CEO talent in spite of the high search costs, because in doing so 
they may find an individual who is a better match to the firm’s current needs than 
internal candidates are.   
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It seems likely however, that the magnitude of the effects of CEO heterogeneity 
on external hiring costs and benefits are not equal. External hiring costs are not expected 
to bind when external hiring benefits are high; their effect should be limited to the subset 
of firms that do not have large expected benefits of hiring externally. Therefore it is 
expected that benefits of participating in the external market for CEO talent will 
dominate in the cross section, while the effects of costs of external CEO labor market 
searches will be significant in the subsample where expected benefits are relatively low. 
7.2.1 Benefits of external labor market participation related to potential performance  
          improvement 
 A large number of studies find that poor firm performance is a significant 
determinant of CEO departures.
18
   This result suggests that boards of directors believe 
that replacement CEOs will improve firms’ performance when the incumbent can or will 
not.  Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Parrino (1997), 
(Denis and Denis (1995), and Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) find a significant 
negative relation between firm performance and replacement of the CEO with an 
outsider.   This result indicates that when the potential to improve firm performance is 
greater, firms are more likely to choose external candidates.  Outsiders have not 
contributed to the recent performance problems, and may have experience and skills  
                                                 
18
 Brickley (2003) presents a discussion of the literature related to CEO departures and firm performance. 
Both earlier studies and more recent analyses that include Goyal and Park (2002), Farrell and Whidbee 
(2003), Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004), Kaplan and Minton (2006), and Jenter and Kanaan (2006) 
find that firm operating and stock price performance are negatively related to the likelihood of 
disciplinary CEO turnovers.  But, firm performance explains only a small portion of the variation in forced 
CEO departure decision logit models.   
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related to reducing costs or restructuring of assets and financial structure that insiders do 
not have.  Under these circumstances, matching to an executive who has skills that are 
specific to the firm’s current production technology and product markets may be of 
lesser importance.   
7.2.2 Benefits of external labor market participation related to higher levels of general  
          management skills 
 Several recent papers (Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007), Frydman (2007), 
Cremers and Grinstein (2008), Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010)) suggest that an increase in 
firms’ demand for general management skills rather than firm or industry specific skills 
is a significant factor in the increase in external CEO succession over time.  Murphy and 
Zabojnik (2007) provide a detailed discussion of the reasons why demand for general 
management skills may have increased over time. They suggest that in recent years 
CEOs have become less focused on internal operations, and more focused on external 
constituencies such as shareholders, institutions, and analysts.   Consequently, 
communications skills have become more important.  Furthermore, Murphy and 
Zabojnik suggest that scientific inquiry in areas related to management, economics, 
accounting, and finance have resulted in a large body of knowledge that affects 
management decisions, but is not specific to any one organization.  Finally, advances in 
information management may make some portions of firm specific knowledge more 
easily available to externally appointed executives.  This may reduce the amount of time 
needed for a newly appointed outsider to access and analyze firm or industry specific 
information prior to making decisions.  Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) find that increases 
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in CEO pay coincide with increases in a proxy for general management skills, the 
percentage of CEOs holding MBA degrees.   
7.2.3 Benefits related to external labor market matching based on changing industry  
          conditions 
Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) present a theory that incorporates multiple 
dimensions of CEO heterogeneity and multiple industries in a model matching firms and 
individuals with outside options.  They show theoretically that shocks to firm skill set 
demands result in productivity decline, managerial turnover, and a higher likelihood of 
external inter-industry hires.  The predicted increase in hiring outside of the industry is 
because industry insiders will tend to have skill sets similar to the incumbent. After a 
shock to the industry the firm demands a different skill set. Consistent with their 
theoretical predictions, Eisfeldt and Kuhnen find that while controlling for the firm’s 
relative performance in both stock returns and returns on assets, industry average return 
on assets and industry stock returns are negatively related to both forced and voluntary 
CEO departures.  Their empirical results also show that replacement CEOs are more 
likely to come from outside the firm and outside the industry when the industry has 
lower ROA.    
Cremers and Grinstein (2008) also suggest that firms’ demand for CEO skills 
that are related to external industry conditions may influence the decision to participate 
in the external market for CEO talent.   They control for industry median capital 
expenditures/sales, and research and development/sales in CEO succession regressions, 
and find that the scaled research and development (R&D) measure is negatively related 
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to the likelihood that the firm replaces the CEO with someone from outside the firm’s 
industry.  This suggests that managing firms during times of high investment in R&D at 
the industry level requires industry specific expertise. 
7.3 Hypotheses related to costs and benefits of participating in the external market for  
       CEO talent 
In this section we present hypotheses focusing on the importance of external 
hiring costs, and external hiring benefits derived from matching to external executives 
with varying proportions of industry specific to general management skills.  Descriptions 
of the empirical measures of external hiring costs and benefits are presented in Section 
8.3 below. 
1)  Firms that face lower search costs related to higher homogeneity of human resources 
in external executive labor are more likely to participate in the external market for CEO 
talent.  This relation is expected to be stronger in the subsample of firms where the 
benefits of external labor market participation are low.  This implies a positive relation 
between the measure of homogeneity and the likelihood of external appointments within 
the industry, conditional upon an interaction with low expected benefit to external labor 
market participation. 
2) Firms that face lower search costs related to higher homogeneity of human resources 
in external executive labor markets are able to make higher quality external matches, on 
average, when compared to firms that contract in more heterogeneous external 
executive labor pools.  Based on this, I predict a positive relation between the proxy for 
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industry homogeneity and the likelihood that the newly appointed CEO will survive for 
at least three years. 
3.  Firms that demand more industry specific skills relative to general management skills 
will be more likely to promote from within or hire externally within the industry, rather 
than appointing new CEOs from outside the industry.  Proxies for firm’s demand for 
industry specific skills are predicted to be negatively related to the selection of an 
external inter-industry appointment. 
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8.  DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION FOR THE ANALYSIS OF COSTS 
AND BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATING IN THE EXTERNAL MARKET FOR 
CEO TALENT 
 
8.1 Data 
To generate the sample, I identify CEO turnover events in the fiscal years 1997-
2007  in Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database.  Accounting information is from the 
Compustat Annual data set, and data on firm segments are obtained from the Compustat 
Segments database.  Stock return data are from CRSP, and data on boards of directors 
are from the RiskMetrics database.   I obtain information on turnover circumstances and 
newly hired CEO characteristics by a search of Lexis-Nexis news announcements related 
to the turnover, and the hiring firms' proxy statements.   
New CEO appointments are classified as internal successions if the new CEO has 
been employed at the firm for more than one calendar year prior to the CEO appointment 
announcement.   Executives who have been employed by the firm for less than one 
calendar year prior to the CEO appointment announcement are classified as external 
hires.    
CEO appointments that are described as interim arrangements are excluded from 
the sample, as are financial firms and utilities.  CEO turnover events that occur because 
of mergers are also excluded.   After merging the turnover sample with data from 
Execucomp, Compustat, RiskMetrics and CRSP, and eliminating observations with 
missing data, a sample of 1587 CEO succession events at 1,083 firms remains. The final 
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sample consists of 1,133 new CEOs who were promoted internally; the remaining 454 
are outside hires.  I classify external hires as intra-industry if they are hired within the 
same two digit SIC code.  One hundred and thirty of the externally hired CEOs move 
from another firm within the hiring firm’s industry, the remaining 324 are inter-industry 
hires. 
8.2 Turnover type and external successions  
 Panel A of Table B-1 presents summary statistics of variables related to types of 
CEO departure for internal and external successions, intra-industry and inter-industry 
external hires.  Panel B presents summary statistics on the most recent employment type 
of newly appointed external CEOs.   
8.2.1 Planned and unplanned retirements 
CEO successions are classified as planned if news announcements state that the 
succession is part of a planned succession.  Anecdotal evidence from search 
professionals suggests that in earlier time periods when outside hires were less common, 
succession planning was largely the responsibility of the CEO (Carey and Ogden (2000), 
Wakerle, (2001)).  The CEO would select his successor and prepare him for the position; 
input and assistance from the board of directors was limited.   Recently, the board of 
directors has become more involved in the succession planning process for inside 
successions. The board is heavily involved when the firm decides to search for a new 
CEO externally.
 19
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 Typically, news announcements of external executive hiring events include commentary by the 
chairman of the board, and often refer to a search committee of the board.  Search committees usually 
include members of the compensation committee; and in some cases the compensation committee is the 
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In the event that an insider without prior CEO experience is promoted, it is 
helpful for the CEO elect to have time to transition from a more focused role within the 
firm to the CEO position.  Many firms begin planning the succession years in advance of 
the CEO's expected retirement.  Evidence from news announcements suggests that 
planned successions may be announced as early as three years prior to a CEO's actual 
departure; but it is more common for succession plans to be publicly announced in the 
year prior to the turnover.  Generally, at the time the succession plan is announced, the 
CEO elect is given increased responsibilities.  CEO elects are often given complete 
responsibility for overseeing the firm’s operations prior to being given the CEO title.   
In the past, most planned successions involved promotions of internal candidates; 
however in recent years firms have become more likely to implement external 
successions that are planned successions.  When outsiders are brought in with the 
intention of promoting to CEO it is common for them to begin as chief operating officer 
(COO) or vice president.  This provides time for the outside CEO elect to acquire some 
firm specific, and possibly industry specific knowledge before being promoted to CEO.   
Approximately 36% of the CEO turnover sample consists of planned CEO successions.  
Nearly 13% of the planned successions are external appointments; of these, 
approximately 67% involve inter-industry hires.  CEO departures are classified as 
retirements without succession plans if the departing CEO is 65 years or older in the  
                                                                                                                                                
search committee.  The fact that compensation committee members are independent directors who have 
experience evaluating CEOs’ performance and compensation relative to peers probably influences this 
outcome.    
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turnover year, and no information is found in news announcements suggesting that the 
CEO was forced out, hired away, died, had health problems, or had a succession plan in 
place.  For executives who depart prior to age 65 and not for any of the reasons listed 
above, I search news announcements to determine the cause of the CEO’s departure.  
The vast majority of these unclassified departures are described as retirements;
20
 
therefore all unclassified CEO departures are re-categorized as unplanned retirements.  
The highest percentage of inter-industry hires, 74%, occurs in the unplanned retirement 
sample.   
8.2.2 Exogenous CEO departures 
Turnovers that may be considered exogenous to the board’s succession decisions 
include events in which the departing CEO is hired away by another firm, dies, or steps 
down due to health issues.
 21
  In this sample 1.9% of all turnovers involve CEO 
departures due to poor health or death.  Because the CEO departures related to health 
problems and mortality are a very small portion of the sample, and should be exogenous, 
these are excluded from subsequent analyses.  CEO hiring away events comprises 3.6% 
of the sample.  Approximately 32% of the CEOs who are hired away are followed by 
external appointments.   
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 Less than ten percent  of the unclassified departures report in news announcements that the CEO’s 
reason for leaving is to pursue other business or entrepreneurial opportunities, contribute to non-profit 
endeavors, or engage in active recreational pursuits such as sailing around the world. 
21
 Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) classify normal retirements as exogenous; the logical justification for this is 
based on the fact that the departing CEO’s age is not within the firm’s control.  Our classification is more 
restrictive in that we assume the retirement timing decision is endogenous.  Strictly speaking, only health 
problems or deaths that arise from purely random causes are truly exogenous events.  Having the CEO 
hired away may be partially caused by the firm’s failure to adequately compensate the CEO for outside 
opportunity costs. But, this outcome is significantly affected by the decision of another firm to make the 
CEO an offer; and this can be reasonably assumed to be beyond the current employer’s control. 
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8.2.3 Forced departures 
I categorize CEO departures as forced departures based upon Parrino’s (1997) 
method of indentifying involuntary CEO departures.  CEO departures are classified as 
forced if they are described as forced in news announcements, or if all of the following 
conditions are met:  (1) the departure was not announced at least 6 months in advance, 
(2), the departing CEO does not leave for reasons related to health, death, or to accept 
another position elsewhere, and (3) the departing CEO is under the age of 60 and 
therefore less likely to be retiring.    Approximately 28% of the CEO departures are 
forced departures.  Forty-one percent of the forced CEO departures are followed by 
external CEO successions.  The inter-industry hiring rate for forced CEO departures is 
approximately 71%. 
8.2.4 Prior employment of externally appointed CEOs 
I obtain data on non-public firms from the databases in Hoover’s Company 
Records, Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations, or Reference USA.  In our sample, 
approximately 75% of all the external appointments involve new CEOs who were most 
recently employed by another publicly traded, U.S. or Canada listed firm.  The 
remaining new CEOs come from private firms or partnerships (21%), or foreign firms 
that do not trade on North American exchanges (4%).  The percentages of foreign firm 
and private firm hires are both slightly higher in the inter-industry sample than they are 
in the intra-industry hire sample.  The small percentage of CEOs being hired directly 
from foreign firms may simply be the result of language barriers, or the unwillingness of 
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high level foreign executives to move themselves and their families to North America.  It 
may also have to do with difficulty matching between different corporate cultures.   
European firms operate in a context that includes a higher level of socialization 
of healthcare, childcare, and job security, and demands attention to multiple 
stakeholders.  Firms based in North America focus mainly on shareholders; and interact 
with other stakeholders as the law requires.  These differences could affect both 
communication skills and risk management, as the stakeholder framework entails 
attention to both idiosyncratic risk and systemic risk, while the shareholder oriented U.S. 
system requires focus on systemic risk.   
Major Asian companies also have many qualified executives. Here there are also 
likely to be significant differences in corporate culture as well.  Many major Asian 
companies still retain a strong family owned orientation, and in Japan, Korea, and China 
there is often long history of involvement with the government as well.  Asian firms may 
also have a significantly different relation to debt holders, such as in the Japanese 
keiretsu (typically not family controlled) which have an “affiliated bank” that gives the 
companies in the keiretsu relatively easy access to debt.  These differences in corporate 
culture may also contribute to the relatively low percentage of CEOs being hired directly 
from foreign firms. 
8.3 Measures of costs and benefits of external labor market participation 
This section presents summary statistics of proxies for costs and benefits of 
participating in the external market for CEO talent.  Means and medians are presented in 
Table B-2. 
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8.3.1External hiring costs 
 I replicate Parrino’s (1997) proxy for industry homogeneity in order to examine 
the importance of external hiring costs in CEO succession decisions during our sample 
period.  The industry homogeneity proxy captures the proportion of variation in monthly 
stock prices that is explained by two digit industry stock price variation
22
.  Industries that 
are more homogenous are those in which individual firm stock prices tend to move 
together with the industry average stock price.  This is assumed to be the result of 
differences in the homogeneity of production technology and product markets across 
industry groupings.  In the turnover sample the mean (median) homogeneity measure is 
12.56 (12.61).  These are statistically lower, but similar in magnitude to the mean 
(median) industry homogeneity measures in the larger Execucomp sample of non-
turnover firm years: 13.27 (13.29).  The mean and median of the homogeneity proxy for 
both the CEO succession sample and non-turnover firm years are both  lower than 
Parrino’s sample mean (median) industry homogeneity proxy, which was 0.2974 
(0.2823). It is possible that average industry homogeneity measures have decreased in 
recent years; however this turnover sample is based upon the S&P 1500 while Parrino’s 
data was based upon 500 firms included in the Forbes Annual Compensation surveys 
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 I follow Parrino’s (1997)  methodology in constructing this measure.  In particular, I calculate the 
homogeneity proxy only for industries that have at least 35 firms in the two digit SIC group.  For 
industries that have more than 50 firms, a random selection of 50 firms is chosen to calculate the 
homogeneity proxy. This ensures that variation in the homogeneity proxy is not significantly affected by 
the number of firms in the industry. 
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between 1971 and 1989.  Therefore the two samples differ by construction as well as by 
time period.
23
  
8.3.2 Measures of firm demand for industry specific versus general management skills 
 The segment sales Herfindahl index concentration measure is included as a proxy 
for firms’ demand for industry specific skills rather than general management skills.  
Firms whose operations are more concentrated in one industry are expected to be more 
likely to emphasize skills and experience related to the firm’s production technology and 
product markets.   Less focused firms are expected to put a higher weight on general 
management skills related to the ability of the CEO to manage a diversified portfolio of 
real assets, and to communicate effectively with both internal and external stakeholders.   
The mean (median) segment sales concentration measure in the CEO succession sample 
is 18.78 (13.48); this is considerably lower than the mean (median) segment sales 
concentration measure in the firm years in which no CEO turnovers occurred: 20.28 
(15.01).  This suggests that without conditioning on other information, more focused 
firms are less likely to implement CEO successions.   
 A second variable related to firms’ demand for industry specific skills rather than 
general management skills that is included in the main analyses is the firm’s industry 
adjusted operating return on assets.  This variable is measured in the year prior to the 
CEO departure, and is calculated as sales revenues less operating expenses, divided by 
total assets.   It is industry adjusted by subtracting the two digit SIC industry median.   
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 Including only S&P 500 firms in the analysis makes our sample firms more similar to the Forbes 500.  In 
this case the mean industry homogeneity proxy for the full sample is 13.90.   
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This performance measure is lower in the turnover sample than it is in the sample of 
non-turnover CEO-firm years, suggesting that poor operating performance is a 
significant factor in CEO succession decisions. 
8.3.3 Control variables 
Market model buy and hold abnormal returns are included to control for firm 
stock price performance in CEO departure and succession regressions.  The market 
model abnormal returns are measured in the 12 months prior to the departing CEOs 
departure announcement (over months -12 to -1), or in the prior fiscal year for non-
turnover firm years.  Following Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) I include industry average 
ROA in the year prior to the new hire event in our analyses.  This is intended to control 
for industry conditions that may prompt firms to match to different executive skill sets.  
In order to control for broader economic factors that might affect CEO succession 
decisions in a similar manner, I also include lagged 12 month buy and hold market 
returns.  These are measured in the fiscal year prior to the CEO succession event. 
 A measure of firm size is included in the analyses.   Firm size may affect CEO 
departure and appointment decisions because the marginal effect of CEO ability, 
suitability, and effort may vary with firm size.  Baker and Hall (2004), Gabaix and 
Landier (2008) present related theory and empirical evidence.  This may increase the 
benefits of considering the widest range of candidates in order to find the best possible 
match.  Alternatively, firm size may capture some portion of the firm’s internal supply 
of CEO candidates.  
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Board independence and size are included as controls for internal governance 
mechanisms that may affect CEO firings and external succession decisions (See 
Weisbach (1988), Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani (1996), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998), Laux (2008), for related theory and empirics).  I also create a measure of board 
“busyness,” this is the average number of other corporate boards on which the firm’s 
board members serve.  Board members who serve on multiple other corporate boards 
may be too busy to engage in highly time consuming searches in the external market for 
CEO talent
24
.  Alternatively, board members who hold a larger number of other board 
memberships may have more experience in CEO successions and CEO searches.  The 
expected relation between the board busyness measure and the likelihood of external 
successions is therefore not clear.  An indicator that the board has a classified structure is 
also included in order to control for variation in the extent to which board memberships 
are protected from external pressure.  All board variables are based upon RiskMetrics 
data.  CEO age and tenure are important determinants of retirement decisions, and may 
also capture some variation in individual experience or judgment, or entrenchment.   
These are obtained from Execucomp data.   
A correlation matrix is presented in Table B-3.  These are shown in order to 
allow comparison of univariate relations with those obtained in the multivariate analysis. 
Univariate correlations for the variables specific to the turnover sample (CEO departure 
and succession types) include only 1499 observations in which turnovers occurred.   
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 See Fich and Shivdasani (2006) for related evidence showing that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance is weaker when the majority of board members hold three or more directorships.    
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Correlations for other variables are based on the sample of all CEO turnover and non-
turnover firms years (N=14,690).  Univariate correlations are generally similar to those 
presented in the multivariate regressions, although significance levels do vary.   
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9.  MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF CEO SUCCESSION DECISIONS AND 
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATING IN THE EXTERNAL 
MARKET FOR CEO TALENT 
 
 This section presents multivariate analysis of the effects of the proxies for 
external hiring costs and external hiring benefits related to demand for specific versus 
more general skill sets on CEO succession decisions. 
9.1 External hiring costs 
 The analysis of the effect of external hiring costs on external labor market 
participation is based upon Parrino’s (1997) proxy for industry homogeneity.  I first 
examine the importance of this variable in the choice of an internal versus external 
succession (presented in Table B-5) and internal versus external succession choices in 
subsamples based on planned, unplanned retirement, and forced CEO departures 
(presented in Tables B-6 and B-7).  Evidence of a significant relation between the proxy 
for industry homogeneity and the choice of hiring an executive search firm to aid the 
search, and the probability that the newly hired CEO survives for more than three years; 
is presented in Table B-9.   
For all logistic and multinomial logit models, I show both odds ratios and 
standardized estimates.  The odds ratio interpretation is the change in the likelihood of 
the named outcome occurring rather than the specified alternative outcome, in response 
to a one unit change in the listed regressor. The interpretation of the standardized odds is 
the change in the likelihood of the named outcome being chosen over the specified 
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alternative, for a one standard deviation change in the listed regressor.  The standardized 
estimates are presented because interpretation of the relative importance of individual 
covariates is difficult when these each have different units of measurement.  
 Because the hypotheses related to the effect of industry homogeneity on external 
succession practices involve interaction effects with the reasons for the departing CEO’s 
reason for leaving, I first briefly discuss results of a multinomial logit regression of 
alternative CEO departure types versus the no turnover reference category presented in 
Table B-4.  Here the primary focus is the extent to which the CEO departure is 
motivated by poor performance at the firm (measured by industry adjusted OROA or 12 
month market model BHAR in the year prior to the CEO departure), poor industry 
performance (measured as industry average ROA in the prior fiscal year), or broader 
economic declines (measured by CRSP value weighted market buy and hold returns in 
the prior fiscal year).  I focus on these variables because potential benefits associated 
with improving performance or adapting to changing external conditions are expected to 
increase as firm or broader industry and market conditions decline.   
 The likelihood of planned CEO departure has a marginally positive relation to 
industry adjusted operating performance; and is not significantly related to firm stock 
price performance, industry average ROA, or the value weighted market buy and hold 
return.  This suggests that planned CEO successions are more likely to be implemented 
when the firm has lower need to improve performance, and that they are unrelated to the 
need to adapt to changing industry and market conditions.   The likelihood of an 
unplanned retirement occurring is negatively related to the firm’s buy and hold abnormal 
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return, and unrelated to industry and market performance measures.  Forced CEO 
departures are negatively related to own firm operating and stock price performance 
measures, industry average ROA, and market buy and hold returns.   
In brief, these results suggest that planned successions are implemented when 
there is relatively little potential for performance improvement or other adaptive 
changes.  External hiring costs are therefore more likely to bind within the planned 
succession subsample. Forced CEO departures are implemented when the benefits of 
improving own firm performance are high, and when the need to adapt to declining 
industry and market conditions is also relatively high.  Unplanned retirements are 
associated with potential improvements to stock price performance, but are unrelated to 
operating performance or industry and market conditions.  Because the potential benefits 
of external labor market participation related to performance improvement and or the 
need for adaptive changes are likely to be higher in the forced and unplanned voluntary 
subsamples, it is not expected that external hiring costs will be a significant determinant 
of the external hiring decision in these two subsamples. 
9.1.1 External hiring costs and the choice of an external versus internal succession 
Table B-5 presents relative risk ratios for three logistic regression specifications 
based on the full CEO turnover sample that remains after dropping CEO departures 
motivated by hiring away events, health or death.    The first column presents results of a 
logistic regression estimating the likelihood of an external succession being chosen over 
the internal succession reference category.  Columns 2 and 3 present results from a 
multinomial logit model of external intra-industry and external inter-industry succession 
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choices, compared to the internal succession reference category.  The last column 
presents result of a logit regression modeling the likelihood that external inter-industry 
successions are chosen over the external intra-industry reference category in the 
subsample of 427 external successions.  These regressions control for CEO tenure, and 
an indicator that the succession was planned, in order to account for variation in the 
amount of time since the executive was hired that the board of directors had to develop a 
back-up strategy, or may have been considering possible replacements. Results related to 
industry homogeneity do not differ significantly if I omit these variables. 
 The industry homogeneity proxy is not significantly related to any of the external 
succession choices modeled for the full sample of turnover firms.  Eisfeldt and Kuhnen 
(2010) also examine the importance of this variable in a sample of recent CEO 
succession decisions and find that it is not significant in their analyses.  However, the 
hypothesis related to the proxy for external hiring costs is that its importance is 
conditional on both (1) a distinction between intra-industry and inter-industry hiring, and 
(2) a relatively low level of expected benefits to hiring outside.  Results in Tables B-6 
and B-7 present analyses of subsamples in which expected benefits of external hiring 
should matter more or less. 
Table B-6 presents results for three different multinomial logit specifications.  
Robust standard errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.  Each column presents 
results for the choice of an external succession rather than internal succession in the 
respective CEO departure subsample: planned, unplanned retirement or forced CEO 
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departure.  Each model also includes internal and external successions for the other two 
CEO departure categories; these results are suppressed to conserve space.  
  The industry homogeneity proxy is positively related to the likelihood of a 
planned external succession being chosen over a planned internal succession.  The odds 
ratio and standardized odds indicate that a one unit (standard deviation) increase in the 
industry homogeneity proxy is associated with an increase in the likelihood of external 
planned successions by a factor of 1.047 (1.220).  Industry homogeneity is not 
significantly related to the likelihood of external succession in the unplanned retirement 
or forced CEO departure subsamples.  Evidence that industry homogeneity matters in 
external hiring choices for planned successions, but is not related to unplanned external 
successions, is consistent with the hypothesis that lower external hiring costs matter for 
more "routine" successions where fewer changes are anticipated and the expected 
benefits of performance improvement or other changes are lower.   
Table B-7 presents results from multinomial logit regressions of the choice of 
external intra-industry succession or external inter-industry succession rather than the 
internal succession reference category within each CEO departure type subsample. In 
each regression model, both internal and external succession choices for the other two 
CEO departure types are included as separate choice outcomes; these are not tabulated.   
Robust standard errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.    
 Results in the first column of Table B-7 show that the positive relation between 
the proxy for industry homogeneity and external succession in the planned departure 
subsample is driven by external intra-industry replacement decisions.  The magnitude of 
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the estimate indicates that a one percent (standard deviation) increase in the industry 
homogeneity proxy increases the likelihood that the firm will hire outside within the 
industry by a factor of approximately 1.07 (1.184), with a p-value of 0.010.  This result 
is consistent with the prediction that external hiring costs matter more when firms have 
relatively low potential benefits of hiring outside related to performance improvements 
or the need to adapt to changing external conditions.  The likelihood of a planned CEO 
departure occurring is not significantly related to poor firm performance or changes in 
industry or market conditions; therefore these firms are more likely to be seeking 
matches with executives who have skill sets and expertise related to the firm’s current 
operations.  Under these conditions, the costs of hiring outside play a more important 
role in the choice of promoting an internal candidate rather than matching in the external 
intra-industry market for CEO talent.  
9.1.2 External hiring costs and external search mechanisms 
In the discussion above, I present results consistent with the prediction that 
external hiring costs are important in external CEO succession decisions when the 
relative benefits of participating in the external market for CEO talent are relatively low.    
In this section I seek additional evidence that industry homogeneity affects external 
search processes in some meaningful way. 
 News announcements and proxy statements are searched for information used to 
create an indicator of firms’ self-reported hiring of an executive search firm to aid in the 
external succession process.  Table B-8 presents summary statistics of this variable for 
the sample of 412 external successions for which I found some commentary on the CEO 
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search process.  Panel A presents the percentage of firms reporting involvement of a 
professional search firm within the CEO departure type subsamples.  Difference of 
median tests indicate that firms are neither more nor less likely to hire a search firm after 
any CEO departure type, or when hiring inside or outside of the two-digit SIC industry. 
 Panel B present summary statistics of the covariates related to external hiring 
costs and benefits in the sample of firms that report hiring a search firm (N=85), and 
those that do not (N=327).  Difference of median tests show that the subsample of firms 
that report hiring a search firm includes firms that operate in more homogenous 
industries, are larger, have larger boards, and have board members who hold more board 
memberships on other corporate boards. 
 The first column of Table B-9 presents results of a logistic regression of the 
choice of hiring or not hiring an executive search firm to aid in the external CEO search 
process.  The industry homogeneity proxy is significantly positively related to the choice 
of hiring a search firm rather than delegating the search process to a committee of the 
board.  This is consistent with the possibility that when the board seeks to match on 
dimensions related to past experience with industry specific production technology and 
product markets; the search process can more easily be outsourced to search 
professionals when the firm operates in a more homogenous industry.  When firms seek 
to hire executives on a more complex set of skill requirements, the board must be more 
involved in the search process and evaluation of alternative match combinations 
presented by a more heterogeneous candidate pool.   
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 The multivariate analysis also shows that operating performance is negatively 
related to the likelihood that the board hires a professional search firm.  This variable 
was not significant in univariate difference of means tests; so its importance in this 
decision seems to depend upon the other covariates in the regression.  This result 
provides evidence that holding all else equal, when firms seek to match to executives 
with experience that is related to improving basic operating efficiency, the ability of an 
outside search firm to select CEO candidates with pertinent experience, and to select 
good matches is relatively high. This may be because industry experience and 
performance relative industry benchmarks are more easily observable to outside search 
professionals. 
 Firm size is also significantly positively related to the likelihood that the board 
chooses to hire an external search firm.  Our results presented in Tables B-5, B-6, and B-
7 show that larger firms are less likely to hire outside of the industry.  In light of this, we 
again interpret this result as being consistent with the prediction that boards are more 
likely to hire executive search professionals when seeking to match on observable 
dimensions related to expertise and experience that are relevant to the hiring firm’s 
production technology and product markets.  
 Taken together, these results related to firms’ hiring of search firms are 
consistent with the possibility that when firms seek to match on more observable 
dimensions related to industry specific expertise that is more similar among all firms 
within the industry, the search can be outsourced to consultants who conduct a relatively 
standardized search.   This is more efficient than delegating the task to board members 
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who as a group have less executive search experience than the professional search firms 
do. 
9.1.3 External search costs and the survival of newly appointed CEOs 
 In this section I discuss results related to the effect of the proxy for industry 
homogeneity on the likelihood that newly appointed CEOs in the external succession 
subsample will survive the first three years.  Results of a logistic regression of three year 
survival indicator on the proxy for industry homogeneity are presented in the second 
column of Table B-9.    The regression also includes controls for firm focus, operating 
and stock price performance prior to the CEO turnover, firm size, industry and market 
performance measures prior to the CEO turnover, board independence, size, classified 
status, and average number of other boards, the age of the new CEO in the year hired, 
and an indicator that a search firm assisted the external search. 
 The industry homogeneity proxy is significantly positively related to the 
likelihood that the newly appointed CEO survives the first three years.  The relative risk 
ratio is 1.053 with a p-value of 0.060; and the standardized estimate is 1.274.  This result 
is consistent with the prediction that firms operating in more homogenous industries are 
able to make higher quality matches when participating in the external market for CEO 
talent, and therefore experience fewer repeat turnovers early in the new CEO’s tenure.   
Estimated coefficients of control variables indicate that three year survival likelihoods 
are negatively related to firm focus and the age of the newly appointed CEO in his first 
year; and positively related to firm stock price performance in the year prior to the CEO 
turnover event. 
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9.2 External hiring benefits related to specific versus general managerial skills 
Results relevant to the analysis of the importance of specific versus general 
management skills are presented in CEO departure regressions (Table B-4), external 
CEO appointment decisions (Tables B-5, B-6, and B-7), and boards’ descriptions of 
externally appointed CEO’s relevant expertise and experience (Table B-10).   Our 
primary variables of interest in the CEO departure analysis are the measure of firm 
focus.  In external versus internal succession choices the variables of interest include 
both the Herfindahl index measure of firm focus, and industry adjusted operating 
performance.  Primary variables of interest in the analysis of newly appointed CEO’s 
expertise or skills as described by individuals at the hiring firm are based upon keywords 
in statements made by board members of the hiring firm in the appointment 
announcement. 
9.2.1 Industry specific skills in CEO departure decisions 
Examining CEO departures allows indirect examination of the firm focus proxy 
for firms’ demand for industry specific skills rather than general management skills.  If 
CEOs of more focused firms are less likely to be hired away by other firms, this is 
consistent with the expectation that executives employed by these firms have relatively 
few general management skills that are easily transferable to other firms.  Assuming that 
these executives who are not hired away are well suited to the firms at which they are 
employed, this result would provide support for the assertion that firm focus is an 
appropriate proxy for the hiring firm’s demand for industry specific and firm specific 
skills, rather than general management skills. 
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 Table B-4 presents results of a multinomial regression of alternative CEO 
departure types versus the no turnover reference category.  Thirty unplanned successions 
that are related to health issues or death of the departing CEO are excluded from this 
stage of the analysis.  This leaves a sample of 1,557 succession events.  Regression 
coefficients presented in Table B-4 have been converted to relative risk ratios.  Robust 
standard errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.   
Firm focus is negatively related to the likelihood that the CEO will be hired away 
rather than remaining in office for an additional year.  A one percent (one standard 
deviation) increase in the firm focus measure is associated with a decrease in the 
likelihood that an incumbent CEO will be hired away by a factor of 0.968 (0.630).  This 
estimate has a p-value of 0.049.   The lower likelihood that the CEO of a more focused 
firm will be hired away by another firm is consistent with the argument that CEOs of 
more focused firms tend to have relatively low general management skills compared to 
industry specific skills.  Compared to larger and more complex firms, CEOs of focused 
firms manage a simpler portfolio of real assets.  Communicating with various 
stakeholders about corporate decisions and performance outcomes of more focused firms 
is apt to be less complex as well.  The executives of less diversified firms are therefore 
more likely to have skill sets that are demanded by a relatively small set of other firms 
within the industry, resulting in a lower probability of being hired away from the CEO 
position at the current employer. Untabulated regressions using an entropy measure of 
firm diversification produce qualitatively similar results.   
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Control variables in the CEO departure regressions generally have similar effects 
to those found in the existing literature, with two exceptions.  The first is that the 
estimated negative coefficients on the measures of industry ROA and aggregate stock 
market returns have lower significance than other studies find.  The second relates to 
board variables.  The board independence measure is not significantly related to the 
likelihood of any CEO departure outcome.  It may be the case that in the relatively 
recent sample period, there is lower variation in board independence due to regulatory 
requirements.  Board size, classified board status, and the average number of other board 
memberships held by the board are all positively related to the likelihood that firms 
implement planned successions rather than choosing the no turnover alternative.   
This is an interesting result that has not been presented in prior empirical work.  
A number of papers find evidence consistent with hypotheses that classified boards, 
larger boards, and “busy” boards whose members sit on many other boards have lower 
governance strength.  The empirical results in this analysis suggest that one reason why 
boards with these characteristics may be less likely to force out the CEO is because they 
are more likely to replace the CEO in a planned retirement succession.  I also find that 
CEOs at firms with larger boards are more likely to be hired away by other firms.   
 The estimated relative risk ratios for CEO age are generally consistent with prior 
studies.  Both tenure and tenure squared are included in the regressions in order to allow 
for a non-linear relation between this variable and CEO departure outcomes. If the 
squared term is dropped, the CEO tenure variable is not significant or is less significant.  
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With the squared term, CEO tenure is significantly related to planned CEO departures, 
CEO hiring away events, and both forced and possibly forced departures. 
9.2.2 Industry specific skills in CEO appointment decisions  
 Results in columns 2 and 3 of Table B-5 show that the firm focus proxy, the 
segment sales Herfindahl index, is negatively related to the likelihood of choosing an 
external intra-industry succession over the internal succession reference category.  The 
magnitude of the effect on external inter-industry successions is moderate, with an odds 
ratio of 0.988 (p-value=0.093), and a standardized odds ratio of 0.857.   It is unrelated to 
the choice of an external intra-industry succession rather than an internal succession. 
Firm focus is also negatively related to the choice of an inter-industry succession instead 
of an intra-industry succession (Column 4), conditional on an external succession being 
chosen.  The estimated effect indicates that a one percent (one standard deviation) 
increase in the segment sales focus measure is associated with a reduction in the 
likelihood of external inter-industry succession being chosen over a within industry 
succession by a factor of 0.979 (0.720), with a p-value of 0.067.  These findings provide 
some evidence that relative levels of demand for specific skills related to the industry 
rather than general management skills do significantly affect external hiring decisions.   
 Industry adjusted OROA is not significantly related to the likelihood that the firm 
will choose an external succession over an internal succession; but it does affect 
decisions related to hiring inside or outside of the hiring firm’s industry.  Estimates in 
column 2 of Table B-5 show that the estimated relative risk ratio of OROA for the 
choice of an external intra-industry succession being chosen rather than an internal 
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succession is 0.983, with a p-value of 0.000.   Industry adjusted OROA is not 
significantly related to the choice of hiring outside the industry rather than promoting 
from within the firm.  Additionally, a one unit (one standard deviation) increase in 
industry adjusted OROA is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an inter-
industry succession being chosen rather than an intra-industry succession by a factor of 
1.021 (1.384).  This estimate is statistically significant at the one percent confidence 
level. I interpret these results as consistent with the prediction that poor operating 
performance is viewed by boards as a problem that requires some industry experience 
related to the firm’s production technology and product markets.   
 This contrasts with poor stock price performance, which is negatively related to 
the choice of either an intra-industry or inter-industry succession being chosen rather 
than an internal appointment.  Poor stock price performance is influenced both by 
expectations of future cash flows, as well as news of problems with contemporary cash 
flows.  It may be affected by the actions taken by industry rivals, lawsuits, bad news 
about R&D results such as problems in clinical trials for pharmaceutical companies, or 
other issues that affect firm value though mechanisms other than basic operating 
efficiency.  Consequently, declines in buy and hold abnormal stock returns can be 
affected by many factors that are independent of the firm’s basic production technology 
and input and output product markets.  These results suggest that low operating 
efficiency  is significantly related the likelihood that the firm will match externally to 
executives with industry experience; while poor stock price performance may require 
broader managerial skill sets.   
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 Results related to the natural log of total assets indicate that large firms are less 
likely to hire outside, and less likely to hire outside the industry; these findings are 
consistent with the expectation that large firms have larger internal talent pools, and may 
also place more emphasis on matching to executives with experience that is relevant to 
the hiring firm’s production technology and product markets. 
 The estimated coefficients for industry and stock market performance presented 
in Table B-5 are generally consistent with existing empirical work in terms of sign. The 
significance levels on these two variables are somewhat lower than those found in other 
recent empirical work.  And, results related to board structure variables also differ 
somewhat from those reported in earlier studies that focus on the role of boards in CEO 
succession decisions.  Board independence and size are both positively related to the 
likelihood of both external successions and external inter-industry successions being 
chosen over internal successions.  The positive relation between external hires and board 
independence is generally consistent with the corporate governance literature that 
suggests that more independent boards are more likely to maximize firm value by 
considering external replacements who are more capable or motivated than internal 
candidates are.  But, the positive relation between board independence and the inter-
industry succession choice is not predicted by the agency theory perspective.  It may be 
the case that firms with a higher demand for general management expertise are more 
likely to have larger, more independent boards, and are also more likely to hire outside 
of the industry.
25
  If the firm focus variable is only a weak (inverse) proxy for firms’ 
                                                 
25
 Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) make a similar argument. 
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demand for general management skills, there may be an omitted variable that drives the 
positive relation between board size and independence, and external hiring decisions.    
Tables B-6 and B-7 present results of external and external inter-industry and 
intra-industry succession choice for subsamples based upon the reasons for the prior 
CEO’s departure.    Results in Table B-6 suggest that the negative relation between firm 
focus and external CEO successions being chosen over internal successions is strongest 
within the forced CEO departure subsample. In the full cross section of CEO departures, 
firm focus is not significantly related to the choice of internal versus external CEO 
succession being chosen (see Column 1 of Table B-5).  Results in Table B-7 show a 
negative relation between firm focus and external inter-industry CEO succession in the 
unplanned retirement and forced departure subsamples.  Generally speaking, this result 
supports the hypothesis that more focused firms have a higher need to match to 
executives with skill sets that are relevant to their production technology and product 
markets, and are therefore less likely to hire outside of the industry. 
Table B-6 presents results showing that poor operating performance is negatively 
related to the choice of an external succession for both planned CEO retirements and 
unplanned retirements.  When modeling the choice of intra-industry succession 
separately from inter-industry successions in the departure type subsamples, (related 
results are shown in Table B-7) industry adjusted OROA is negatively related to the 
likelihood that an external intra-industry succession will be chosen rather than an 
internal succession; this result holds for all three CEO departure subsamples.  The 
standardized odds ratios across the three regression specifications range from 0.673 to 
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0.886.  I interpret this result as providing support for the hypothesis that improvements 
to poor operating performance require industry specific skills on the part of the new 
CEO. 
 With respect to stock price performance, for both unplanned retirements and 
involuntary departures, the negative relation between any external hiring outcome and 
market model buy and hold abnormal returns remains statistically significant and large 
in magnitude.  Within the unplanned retirement and forced CEO departure outcomes the 
estimated relative risk ratios range from 0.347 to 0.414, and the associated p-values 
range from 0.000 to 0.003.  As before, I interpret the different results on operating 
performance and stock price performance as evidence that operating performance 
problems tend to require some industry expertise, while declines in stock price prompt 
firms to match to individuals who have broader expertise related to improving the firm’s 
long term prospects.  Improving long term cash flows may require activities that are not 
closely related to the current production technology and product markets of the hiring 
firm. 
Empirical results related to industry and stock market performance presented in 
Tables B-6 and B-7 generally have the same sign as those reported in other studies; 
however significance levels are lower.  This may be the result of a different time period 
and different covariates included in the regressions.  Results from the subsample analysis 
in Tables B-6 and B-7 indicate that the negative relation between firm size and external 
inter-industry hiring is strongest in the planned succession subsample.  In the unplanned 
retirement and involuntary subsamples, the estimated effect of firm size on external 
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hiring is also negative, but the estimated odds ratios are smaller in magnitude and 
significance levels are lower.   
In contrast, the positive relation between external and external inter-industry 
hiring decisions, and board independence and board size appear to be primarily driven 
by variation across all three CEO departure subsamples.  The fact that this result is 
specific to inter-industry hires but not intra-industry hires is puzzling.  The existing 
literature related to board structure and CEO turnovers does not generate clear 
predictions as to why a board of directors that is more independent would prefer to 
match to executives outside the hiring firm’s industry.  Again, these results related to 
board independent and size may be affected by some omitted variable that affects both 
board structure and external CEO succession decisions. 
9.2.3 Industry specific skills versus general management skills as reported in CEO  
         hiring announcements 
 In this section I discuss results related to firms’ descriptions of new CEO’s 
experience and skills sets that are reported in CEO hiring announcements.   This data is 
collected for the external succession subsample. The relevant data are presented in Table 
B-10.  I create indicator variables based on keyword use in news announcements.  These 
are grouped together based on similarity to concepts related to general management, 
industry technology or operations, performance improvement, and a miscellaneous 
category. 
 The general management related keywords include: general management, global 
experience, strategy, leadership, marketing/branding, and services or customer relations.  
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Difference of medians tests indicate that firms hiring outside of the industry are more 
likely to use the keywords related to global experience, strategy, leadership, and service 
or customer relations than firms hiring externally within the industry are.  Implicitly, I 
assume that the descriptions of executive’s expertise are 1) truthful, and 2) positively 
correlated with the skill mix that the firm initially set out to hire.   Conditional on these 
assumptions, these results provide support for the hypothesis that firms tend to hire 
outside of the industry when demand for general management skills is higher. 
The industry specific experience keywords include: technical knowledge, 
experience in operations, and industry reputation.  Results of difference of median tests 
show that the firms hiring within the industry are more likely to use any of these 
keywords than firms hiring outside the industry are.  This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that firms seeking to match to executives with industry specific skill sets 
related to production technology, operations, or long experience in other roles within the 
industry are more likely to hire executives currently working within the industry when 
making appointments outside the firm. 
Keywords related to performance improvement include experience with 
restructuring or turning around firm performance, or reducing costs and improving 
profitability.  These variables do not differ significantly between the sample of firms 
hiring externally within the industry, and those that hire outside the industry.  In the 
analysis of demand for industry specific skills versus general management skills 
presented in section 9.2.2, I find evidence the problems with operating performance are 
associated with a higher likelihood of hiring outside within the industry, while stock 
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price performance measures motivate external CEO successions both within and outside 
of the industry.  Keywords used by hiring firms’ boards do not make specific distinctions 
between these two performance metrics and the match to new executive’s skills sets; 
therefore these results based on skill descriptions are not interpreted in the same way. 
And, finally, I include a miscellaneous category that encompasses managing 
growth, R&D or product innovation, finance/accounting expertise, legal knowledge, or 
experience in acquisitions and mergers.  Firms hiring within the industry are neither 
more nor less likely to emphasize the new CEO’s experience in R&D/innovation, 
finance/accounting, or legal expertise.  Firms hiring outside of the industry are more 
likely to mention the new CEO’s ability to manage growth, and less likely to mention 
expertise in acquisitions or mergers.  This suggests that growing a firm’s operations 
involves skills that are more easily transported across industries, while acquiring and 
merging is more likely to involve industry specific skills on the part of the CEO.  
Broadly speaking, the lack of significance for differences of medians for most of the 
miscellaneous keywords indicates that demand for specific skills such as 
finance/accounting or legal expertise are not a significant determinant of firms’ decisions 
to hire outside of the industry.   
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10.  SUMMARY OF RESULTS RELATED TO THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PARTICPATING IN THE EXTERNAL MARKET 
FOR CEO TALENT 
 
 In summary, I present empirical results related to costs and benefits of 
participating in the external market for CEO talent after first providing a discussion of 
existing empirical work in the context of Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm.   Coase’s 
original theory assumes that resources exchanged in the external market are perfect 
substitutes for those that can be produced internally; however, in the case of human 
resources, this is not true.  Internal and external executives may differ significantly in 
their prior experience with industry specific and general management responsibilities.  
They may also have different experience related to improving firm performance or 
choosing between alternative strategies in the face of changing external conditions.   
 CEO heterogeneity on these dimensions, and possibly other areas related to 
personality or risk preferences may increase the perceived benefits of searching in the 
external market for the best possible match.  Heterogeneity of individuals in the external 
market also makes the search process more complex.  Because the market for high level 
executive talent is involves matching under imperfect information, search costs are also 
expected to be positively related to heterogeneity of the human resources being 
contracted.  When the perceived benefits of hiring externally are high, search costs may 
matter less. In cases where the expected benefit of hiring externally is low, search costs 
are more likely to bind.  Therefore, the proxy for external search costs is expected to 
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matter more in the subsample of firms with relatively low perceived benefits of 
participating in the external market for CEO talent. 
 The empirical results are broadly consistent with this prediction.  A proxy for 
external hiring costs based upon industry homogeneity does influence the likelihood of 
an external hire in a subsample of the turnover data that includes firms with relatively 
low potential to improve performance.  In this case, the higher level of industry 
homogeneity should make it easier for firms to match to individuals who have expertise 
that is relevant to the hiring firm’s production technology and product markets when 
hiring externally, but within the industry.    
In order to further understand how industry homogeneity makes external CEO 
searches less costly, I also present analysis external search mechanisms.  I create an 
indicator of firm’s self-reported hiring of an executive search firm to aid in the CEO 
search process.  Firms in more homogenous industries are more likely to hire search 
professionals to aid in the search.  This result indicates that when the hiring firm’s 
production technology and product markets are more similar to other firms in the 
industry, the dimensions on which the firm seeks to match are more easily observed by 
outside consultants.  Firms can more easily delegate portions of the search process to 
external professionals who conduct a more standardized search under these conditions. 
The empirical analysis also provides evidence that when firms do participate in 
the external market for CEO talent; those operating in more homogenous industries have 
higher survival likelihoods in the early years of the new CEO’s tenure.  This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms operating in more homogenous industries are 
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able to make higher quality matches to external individuals who have experience with 
production technology and product markets that are similar to those of the hiring firm.  
These higher quality matches are less likely to break up in the first three years of the new 
CEO’s tenure. 
 I also examine firms’ demand for industry specific skills rather than general 
management skills.  I hypothesize that proxies for firm’s demand for industry specific 
skills will be negatively related to the choice of hiring outside the industry.   Consistent 
with this, a proxy for industry specific skill demand, firm focus, is negatively related to 
the choice of an external inter-industry succession rather than an internal succession.  It 
is also negatively related to the choice of hiring outside the industry rather than inside 
the industry, conditional upon an external succession being chosen.   
A second measure of firms’ demand for industry specific skill sets is based upon 
industry adjusted operating performance.  I predict that poor performance in basic 
operating efficiency differs from poor stock price performance in that problems with 
operating performance require focus on firm’s basic operations in product markets and 
production technology.  Problems with stock price performance are more likely to 
require modifications to firm strategy that are not directly related to the firm’s core 
operations in production and product markets.  After controlling for stock price 
performance, industry adjusted operating return on assets is negatively related to the 
likelihood that the firm will make an external intra-industry appointment rather than 
promoting from within.  It is unrelated to the likelihood of hiring externally outside the 
industry.  Furthermore, the likelihood of an inter-industry succession being chosen over 
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an intra-industry succession is positively related to industry adjusted operating 
performance, within the external hire subsample.  This result also suggests that poor 
operating performance is a problem that requires industry specific experience on the part 
of the incoming CEO. 
Supplementary evidence related to firms’ demand for industry specific versus 
general management skills and inter-industry hiring decisions is obtained by collecting 
information on newly hired CEOs’ skills and expertise reported by the hiring firm in the 
hiring announcement.  I collect this data for the full sample of external CEO successions.  
Our results show that firms appointing new CEOs from outside the industry are more 
likely to use keywords related to general management skills in their descriptions of the 
new CEO’s past experience and accomplishments. Firms appointing new CEOs from 
inside the industry are more likely to use keywords related to technology, operations, 
and industry experience when describing the new CEO’s qualifications. 
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       11.  CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, I study two aspects of boards of directors’ CEO succession 
decisions.  First, I examine whether or not forced CEO departure decisions are based on 
information that the board of directors has, but external investors do not.  I present 
several different selection equations used to create alternative proxies for private 
information.  The first is based on the board’s selection of a forced CEO turnover rather 
than allowing the incumbent CEO to remain in office for an additional year.  The second 
is based on the board’s selection of a forced CEO replacement rather than a voluntary 
CEO succession event, conditional on a CEO succession occurring.  In both cases, the 
proxy for private information is positively related to abnormal returns at the forced CEO 
departure announcement.   
The positive relation between several alternative estimates of the proxy for 
private information and the abnormal announcement returns is consistent with the 
hypotheses that prior to the departure announcement, investors underestimate the 
probability of forced CEO departure, and that private information  revealed in forced 
CEO departure announcements has positive implications for firm value.  External 
investor may underestimate the likelihood of a forced CEO departure occurring either 
because they underestimate the net benefits of replacing the CEO, or because they 
underestimate the board’s true internal governance strength.  
In order to analyze differences between CEO replacement announcements where 
the departure of the incumbent and appointment of the successor are made at the same 
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time, and those in which the incumbent CEO’s departure is announced separately from 
the replacement CEO’s appointment, I split the forced CEO departure sample based on 
same day or separate replacement announcements.  In the subsample with same day 
announcement, the positive relation between the proxy for private information and the 
abnormal announcement returns has lower statistical significance when compared to 
results for the separate announcement day subsample.  This result suggests that the value 
effect of private information revealed in forced CEO departure announcements is 
stronger when the successor CEO is not announced simultaneously.  It may be the case 
that when a higher degree of uncertainty remains about the net benefits of replacement, 
the value of the signal provided by the board’s decision to force out the CEO is higher. 
A second aspect of boards of directors’ CEO succession decisions that I examine 
empirically concerns their decisions to participate in the external market for CEO talent.  
I find evidence suggesting that board decisions to participate in the external market for 
CEO talent are influenced by the costs and benefits of doing so. Value maximizing 
boards should participate in the external market for CEO talent when the expected 
benefits of doing so exceed the costs.  Both costs and benefits of participating in the 
external market may be positively related to the heterogeneity of the human resources 
being contracted.  This is because higher heterogeneity increases the complexity of 
external search; but it also increases the likelihood that a firm can match to an individual 
who has extremely high levels of some skill or area of expertise that the board of 
directors believes will enable the CEO to increase firm value.   
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Cross sectional analyses of a proxy for industry homogeneity shows that this 
variable is positively related to external labor market participation, more standardized 
search processes, and a higher likelihood that a newly appointed CEO will survive three 
years or more.  These findings are generally consistent with prediction that when 
industries are more homogenous, external search costs are lower, and higher quality 
matches may be obtained.    
I also test hypotheses related to benefits of matching to individuals with industry 
specific skills versus general management skills.  Firms may demand higher levels of 
general management skills rather than skills that are specific to the industry or firm 
production technology and product markets because value contributions by the CEO 
may require a broader strategic skill set.  Activities that are more focused on operations 
may be more optimally delegated to lower level managers.   I find that for several 
alternative proxies for industry specific skill demand, there is a negative relation 
between demand for industry specific skills and the decision to hire externally outside 
the industry.   This can be interpreted as support for hypotheses that cross sectional 
variation in benefits associated with industry specific skills leads to fewer CEO 
appointments outside the industry, while benefits of general management skills are 
associated with a higher likelihood of inter-industry CEO appointment. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TABLES OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF 
PRIVATE INFORMATION IN CEO REPLACEMENT DECISIONS 
 107 
Table A-1
No 
turnoverPlanned Unplanned Forced Turnover
Successions Voluntary Successions firm 
Successions years
(N=449) (N=324) (N=356) (N=11,460)
Percent of full CEO turnover sample 39.77% 28.70% 31.53%
Age of incumbent  CEO 62.10 62.12 54.49 56.14
Incumbent CEO tenure (years) 11.34 11.54 6.17 9.10
Total assets in year prior to turnover ($ Millions) 10,444.82   7,532.30      7,303.87 7,664.56   
3 year change in Ind. Adjusted OROA 0.42 -1.03 -3.96 0.12
Market model BHAR 6 months prior to turnover  (%) -2.56 -7.40 -12.48 -1.14
Industry Homogeneity in year prior to turnover   (%) 13.54 13.44 13.21 13.07
Ind. Average ROA in year prior to turnover -6.07 -6.58 -8.80 -6.47
Regulated Industry   (%) 5.79 4.62 4.21 4.97
Six month market BHR in year prior to turnover   (%) 7.19 11.61 5.98 12.85
Independent Directors (%) 65.64 62.16 63.24 64.02
Average age of board members 59.85 59.55 58.42 58.98
Board size 10.37 9.46 9.13 9.42
Classified board  (%) 69.15 66.97 71.15 70.47
This table presents summary statistics of CEO departure circumstances.  CEO departure reasons are classified based on 
data obtained from a search of Lexis-Nexis news announcements and proxy statements.  Planned successions are those 
that are described as planned in news announcements, or those in which the successor is announced  at least 6 months 
before the announcement that the incumbent CEO is leaving.  Forced departures are classified as forced if they are  
publicly described as forced, or meet the following conditions (1) occur before the departing CEO reaches age 60 (2) are 
not announced at least six months in advance, and (3) are not motivated by health, death, or hiring away events. The 
industry homogeneity proxy is calculated following the method of Parrino (1997).  Industry adjusted OROA is calculated 
as sales less operating expenses, divided by total assets.  Six month market model buy and hold returns are based on the 
value weighted CRSP index.  Industry average ROA is the simple average based on the three digit SIC industry.  Market 
buy and hold returns are calculated using the value weighted CRSP index.  Board independence is measured as the 
percentage of independent directors on the firm's board; average number of other boards is the simple average of other 
corporate board memberships held by the firms directors.  Board size is the total number of board members.  Unplanned 
voluntary departures are those that are not classified as either planned or forced.  CEO departures that occur due to 
death, poor health, or hiring away events are excluded from the analysis.
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Table A-2
Planned Unplanned Forced
Successions Successions Successions
Voluntary
Age of incumbent  CEO 0.121 *** 0.119 *** 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.788)
Incumbent CEO tenure -0.013 -0.020 *** -0.075 ***
(0.155) (0.001) (0.000)
Natural log of total assets in year prior to CEO turnover 0.101 *** -0.034 0.071
(0.006) (0.432) (0.116)
3 year change in Ind. Adjusted OROA 0.006 -0.010 -0.029 ***
(0.291) (0.145) (0.000)
Market model BHAR 6 months prior to turnover 0.062 -0.167 -0.899 ***
(0.727) (0.162) (0.004)
Industry Homogeneity in year prior to turnover 0.010 0.020 -0.016
(0.516) (0.262) (0.376)
Ind. Average ROA in year prior to turnover -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.456) (0.597) (0.739)
Regulated Industry -0.002 -0.025 ** -0.101 **
(0.203) (0.046) (0.025)
Six month market BHR in year prior to turnover -0.519 *** -0.434 -0.944 ***
(0.000) (0.182) (0.000)
Percent Independent Directors 0.983 *** -0.042 -0.567
(0.008) (0.942) (0.178)
Average age of board members -0.027 * -0.035 *** -0.059 ***
(0.073) (0.043) (0.004)
Board size 0.076 *** 0.000 -0.011
(0.000) (0.296) (0.746)
Indicator of Classified board 0.073 * -0.103 0.265
(0.530) (0.455) (0.136)
Pseudo R-square 0.0765
The table presents results estimated with a multinomial logit regression, run on the  sample of 12,589 
Execucomp firm years (1997-2005, inclusive) without missing data.   The reference category is "no 
turnover."    Robust standard errors are adjusted for clusters in three digit SIC codes.    P-values are 
presented in parentheses.  The model includes a constant; these are not reported to conserve space.
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Table A-3
Planned Unplanned Forced
Successions Successions Successions
Voluntary
(N=11,909  ) (N=11,784 ) (N=11,816)
Age of incumbent  CEO 0.119 *** 1.004 *** 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.702)
Incumbent CEO tenure -0.013 * -0.020 -0.0736 ***
(0.068) (0.010) (0.000)
Natural log of total assets in yr. prior to CEO turnover event 0.100 -0.034 0.07139
(0.006) (0.435) (0.112)
3 year change in Ind. Adjusted Operating OROA 0.006 -0.011 -0.029 ***
(0.299) (0.118) (0.000)
Market model BHAR 6 months prior to turnover 0.061 -0.161 ** -0.911 ***
(0.741) (0.196) (0.004)
Industry Homogeneity in year prior to turnover 0.009 ** 0.020 -0.015
(0.557) (0.257) (0.395)
Ind. Average ROA in year prior to turnover -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.535) (0.571) (0.733)
Regulated Industry -0.002 -0.045 -0.079 **
(0.245) (0.198) (0.026)
Six month market BHR in year prior to turnover -0.370 *** -0.444 -0.936 ***
(0.001) (0.162) (0.000)
Percent Independent Directors 1.006 *** -0.005 -0.574
(0.008) (0.990) (0.170)
Average age of board members -0.026 *** -0.035 ** -0.059 ***
(0.078) (0.047) (0.004)
Board size 0.077 *** -0.002 -0.012
(0.000) (0.942) (0.722)
Indicator of Classified board 0.071 -0.102 0.269
(0.541) (0.469) (0.129)
Pseudo R-square 0.0958 0.0702 0.0625
Wald Chi-square 275.66 204.47 195.6
Prob > Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table presents results of binomial logit regressions.  The reference category is "no turnover."    In each model, 
firm years with alternative CEO departure types are excluded.  Robust standard errors are adjusted for clusters in 
three digit SIC codes.    P-values are presented in parentheses.  The models include constants; these are not 
reported to conserve space.
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Table A-4
Planned Unplanned Forced
Successions Successions Successions
Voluntary
(N=11,909  ) (N=11,784 ) (N=11,816)
Age of incumbent  CEO 0.051 *** 0.052 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.958)
Incumbent CEO tenure -0.004 -0.008 ** -0.0300 ***
(0.226) (0.022) (0.000)
Natural log of total assets in year prior to CEO turnover 0.038 ** -0.013 0.027
(0.022) (0.488) (0.195)
3 year change in Ind. Adjusted Operating OROA 0.000 -0.005 -0.014 ***
(0.865) (0.107) (0.000)
Market model BHAR 6 months prior to turnover -0.004 -0.059 -0.330 **
(0.617) (0.105) (0.034)
Industry Homogeneity in year prior to turnover 0.004 ** 0.009 -0.004
(0.584) (0.213) (0.612)
Ind. Average ROA in year prior to turnover -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.343) (0.379) (0.692)
Regulated Industry -0.001 -0.009 *** -0.108 *
(0.996) (0.351) (0.051)
Six month market return in year prior to turnover -0.824 *** -0.144 -0.344 ***
(0.000) (0.187) (0.000)
Percent Independent Directors 0.290 * -0.082 -0.021
(0.072) (0.654) (0.236)
Average age of board members -0.017 *** -0.016 ** -0.027 ***
(0.018) (0.031) (0.003)
Board size 0.033 *** -0.001 -0.004
(0.001) (0.115) (0.802)
Indicator of Classified board 0.030 -0.044 0.116
(0.166) (0.261) (0.140)
Pseudo R-square 0.1025 0.0723 0.0602
Wald Chi-square 275.08 213.56 183.28
Prob > Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table presents results of probit regressions.  The reference category is "no turnover."    In each model, firm 
years with alternative CEO departure types are excluded.  Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in three digit 
SIC codes.    P-values are presented in parentheses.  The models include constants; these are not reported to 
conserve space.
 111 
Table A-5
Forced Forced
vs vs
All voluntary All voluntary
(N=1,129) (N=1,129)
Age of incumbent  CEO -0.215 *** -0.117 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Incumbent CEO tenure -0.089 *** -0.049 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Natural log of total assets in year prior to CEO turnover event 0.032 0.021
(0.562) (0.524)
3 year change in Ind. Adjusted Operating OROA -0.027 *** -0.016 ***
(0.001) (0.000)
Market model BHAR 6 months prior to turnover -0.977 *** -0.559 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Industry Homogeneity in year prior to turnover -0.017 -0.010
(0.296) (0.269)
Ind. Average ROA in year prior to turnover 0.007 0.004
(0.159) (0.178)
Regulated Industry -0.179 -0.112
(0.683) (0.635)
Six month buy and hold market return prior to turnover -0.882 ** -0.403 **
(0.041) (0.046)
Percent Independent Directors -0.162 -0.106
(0.790) (0.758)
Average age of board members -0.002 0.002
(0.952) (0.897)
Board size -0.028 -0.021
(0.518) (0.411)
Indicator of Classified board 0.147 0.066
(0.459) (0.568)
Pseudo R-square 0.3092 0.3056
Wald Chi-square 172.19 210.49
Prob > Chi-square 0.000 0.000
This table presents results of binomial logit and probit regressions modeling selection into the forced 
departure sample.  The reference category of voluntary departure includes 449 planned successions and 
324 unplanned voluntary departures.  Firm years in which no turnover occured are excluded from the 
analysis. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clusters in three digit SIC codes.   P-values are 
presented in parentheses.  The modelS includes constants; these are not reported to conserve space.
Logit regression Probit 
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Table A-6
Planned Unplanned Successions Forced
Successions Voluntary Successions
(N=449) (N=324) (N=356)
Mean CAR -0.16% Mean CAR 0.14% Mean CAR -1.14%
Median CAR 0.21% Median CAR 0.19% Median CAR -0.62%
P-value 0.504 P-value 0.646 P-value 0.123
Percent < 0 47.66% Percent < 0 47.53% Percent < 0 55.34%
Standard deviation 5.29% Standard deviation 5.33% Standard deviation 8.72%
(N=258) (N=187)
Successor CEO is announced Mean CAR 0.19% Mean CAR -0.85%
same day as the departure of Median CAR 0.18% Median CAR -0.29%
the incumbent P-value 0.552 P-value 0.157
Percent < 0 46.12% Percent < 0 51.28%
Standard deviation 5.06% Standard deviation 7.77%
Successor CEO is announced after (N=66) (N=169)
the departure announcement Mean CAR -0.06% Mean CAR -1.43% ***
has been made Median CAR -0.16% Median CAR -1.06%
P-value 0.933 P-value 0.002
Percent < 0 53.03% Percent < 0 60.53%
Standard deviation 6.34% Standard deviation 9.13%
Test for Equality of Variance P-value 0.015 P-value 0.087
High (above median) (N=178)
Inverse Mills Ratio Mean CAR -0.87%
Median CAR -0.17%
P-value 0.148
Percent < 0 52.51%
Standard deviation 6.59%
Low (below median) (N=178)
Inverse Mills Ratio Mean CAR -1.41% ***
Median CAR -1.08%
P-value 0.007
Percent < 0 58.19%
Standard deviation 8.80%
Test for Equality of Variance P-value 0.000
This table presents summary statistics of CEO departure announcement abnormal returns for subsamples of 
the full succession sample (N=1,129).  Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are estimated based on a value 
weighted market model, over a two day window (0, 1).   The model uses a 256 day estimation period ending in 
the seventh month prior to the departure announcement. The mean and median CARS presented are not 
standardized, and are expressed as percents.     P-values presented are based on  t-tests using standardized 
returns.   When cutting the sample based on high/low Inverse Mills Ratios, the IMR is estimated based on 
selection of an involuntary CEO departure rather than the no turnover reference category.
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Table A-7
Panel A
CAR  Window (0, 0) (0, 1) (-1, 1)
Planned departures -0.056 -0.059 -0.025
(N=449) (0.217) (0.186) (0.577)
Unplanned voluntary departures -0.053 -0.048 -0.062
(N=324) (0.184) (0.227) (0.207)
Forced departures 0.116 ** 0.121 ** 0.100 *
(N=356) (0.028) (0.023) (0.059)
Panel B
CAR Window (0, 0) (0, 1) (-1, 1)
Forced Departures Inverse mills Ratio 0.021 ** 0.046 ** 0.027 *
(N=356) P-value (0.049) (0.044) (0.062)
Intercept -0.058 ** -0.028 -0.049 *
P-value (0.041) (0.105) (0.099)
Adj. R-square 0.007 0.009 0.006
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
Univariate Regression of alternative event window abnormal returns on the IMR
Correlation between IMR and alternative event window returns
This table presents univariate analysis of the relation between the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) and the abnormal 
announcement return using alternative event windows.  Panel A presents univariate correlations for planned, 
unplanned voluntary, and involuntary departures; and Panel B presents results obtained by regressing the CARs 
on the inverse Mills Ratios  in an OLS model that includes an intercept.  Inverse Mills Ratios are estimated based 
on selection of an involuntary departure rather than the no turnover reference category.  
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Table A-8
Inverse Age of Incumbent Log of Three year Firm MM Industry Ind. Average Regulated Six month Percent Average Board Classified
Mill's incumbent CEO Total Change Ind. BHAR homogeneity ROA Industry Market independent Board Size Board
Ratio CEO Tenure assets Ad. OROA proxy BHR Directors Age
Cumulative abnormal return (0, 1) 0.121 ** 0.008 0.080 * 0.108 ** -0.068 0.054 -0.035 0.135 *** 0.071 0.044 0.021 0.124 *** 0.123 *** 0.021
0.023 0.871 0.099 0.026 0.159 0.194 0.471 0.005 0.143 0.369 0.626 0.004 0.005 0.635
Inverse Mill's Ratio 0.084 0.425 *** 0.077 0.535 *** 0.559 *** -0.038 0.209 *** 0.026 0.335 *** 0.204 *** 0.099 * 0.221 *** -0.141 ***
0.112 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.47 0.000 0.625 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.008
Age of incumbent CEO 0.443 *** 0.121 *** -0.025 *** -0.022 ** -0.036 *** 0.127 *** -0.001 0.027 *** -0.032 *** 0.331 *** 0.100 *** 0.046 ***
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.921 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Incumbent CEO tenure -0.060 *** -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 0.005 -0.08 *** 0.04 *** -0.178 *** 0.073 *** -0.068 *** -0.036 ***
0.000 0.704 0.597 0.321 0.599 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Natural log of total assets -0.019 ** 0.054 *** 0.183 *** 0.224 *** 0.125 *** 0.027 *** 0.141 *** 0.100 *** 0.526 *** 0.099 ***
0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
three year change in Ind. Adj. OROA 0.157 *** 0.015 * -0.012 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.000 0.029 *** 0.048 ***
0.000 0.077 0.178 0.985 0.555 0.290 0.997 0.001 0.000
Firm MM BHAR 6 months prior to turnover 0.022 ** 0.037 *** 0.004 -0.043 *** 0.02 ** 0.012 0.005 0.017 *
0.016 0.000 0.594 0.000 0.031 0.175 0.546 0.058
Industry homogeneity proxy -0.126 *** 0.211 *** -0.070 *** 0.047 *** -0.007 0.151 *** 0.020 **
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.020
Ind. Average ROA 0.147 *** 0.182 *** 0.038 *** 0.111 *** 0.199 *** 0.037 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regulated industry -0.001 0.118 *** 0.044 *** 0.097 *** 0.001
0.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.952
Six month market BHR -0.033 *** 0.01 0.025 *** 0.026 ***
0.000 0.235 0.004 0.003
Percent independent directors 0.128 *** 0.098 *** 0.081 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000
Average Board age 0.177 *** 0.063 ***
0.000 0.000
Board size 0.143 ***
0.000
This table presents univariate correlations for all variables of interest .   The inverse Mill's ratio presented here is based upon selection of a forced CEO departure versus the no turnover reference 
category, and is estimated using maximum likelihood in a Heckman regression in which the cumulative abnormal return in the outcome equation is based upon a (0,1) window.  The CAR estimation 
period ends in the seventh month prior to the event date.  The correlations with the cumulative abormal return and inverse Mill's ratio include 356 observations in which the CEO is forced out.  All other 
correlations include the sample of forced CEO departures and non-turnover firm years (N=11,816).  
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Table A-9
Planned Unplanned Forced  Forced
Successions Voluntary Departures Departures
Successions
(N=449) (N=324) (N=356) (N=356)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.007 -0.049 0.071 ** 0.078 ***
(0.671) (0.598) (0.000) (0.000)
Age of incumbent  CEO 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 **
(0.358) (0.159) (0.140) (0.040)
Incumbent CEO tenure 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.274) (0.311) (0.564) (0.757)
Natural log of total assets in year prior to CEO turnover -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.432) (0.689) (0.596) (0.375)
3 year change in Ind. Adjusted Operating OROA 0.000 0.000 -0.001 *** -0.002
(0.791) (0.215) (0.006) (0.603)
Market model BHAR 6 months prior to turnover 0.013 0.017 ** -0.028 ** -0.006 ***
(0.176) (0.025) (0.019) (0.009)
Industry Homogeneity in year prior to turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.452) (0.680) (0.990) (0.233)
Ind. Average ROA in year prior to turnover 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
(0.606) (0.652) (0.157) (0.264)
Regulated Industry 0.017 0.012 0.019 0.002
(0.274) (0.237) (0.227) (0.244)
Six month market BHR prior to turnover -0.005 0.001 -0.016 -0.019
(0.709) (0.444) (0.568) (0.404)
Percent Independent Directors 0.002 -0.012 -0.032 -0.011
(0.918) (0.644) (0.233) (0.462)
Average age of board members 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.470) (0.273) (0.527) (0.692)
Board size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.137) (0.8301) (0.363) (0.125)
Indicator of Classified board -0.003 0.006 0.009 0.007
(0.532) (0.327) (0.453) (0.489)
Constant -0.11 0.183 -0.081 ** 0.023
(0.171) (0.177) (0.035) (0.178)
Wald Chi-square 6.91 36.67 63.62 62.71
Probability > Chi-square 0.098 0.008 0.000 0.000
Wald (test of independent Equations) Chi-square 0.41 0.38 4.69 27.69
Probability > Chi-square 0.522 0.536 0.000 0.000
The table presents second stage results of Heckman regressions.   In the first three columns, the first stage of each model 
includes only one succession type versus the "no turnover" reference category; alternative succession types are 
dropped.  In the fourth column, the first stage equation models selection of forced versus voluntary departure; firm years 
with no CEO turnover are dropped.  The dependent variable in all columns is the cumulative abnormal return are based on 
a two day window (0, 1).  Robust standard errors are adjusted for clusters in three digit SIC codes.  P-values are presented 
in parentheses.
alternative
Forced vs voluntary 
departure alternative
Selected outcome vs. no turnover
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Table A-10
Panel A
CAR Window (0, 0) (0, 1) (-1, 1)
Forced vs. No turnover alternative outcome
Forced departures 0.037 ** 0.070 *** 0.058 *
with separate annc. (0.029) (0.027) (0.067)
of successor CEO
(N=169)
Forced departures 0.079 0.071 * 0.031
with same day annc. (0.105) (0.086) (0.197)
of successor CEO
(N=187)
Forced vs. Voluntary turnover alternative outcome
Forced departures 0.187 ** 0.188 ** 0.106 *
with separate annc. (0.021) (0.020) (0.092)
of successor CEO
(N=169)
Forced departures 0.086 0.106 0.076
with same day annc. (0.184) (0.123) (0.248)
of successor CEO
(N=187)
Panel B
CAR Window (0, 0) (0, 1) (-1, 1)
Forced vs. No turnover alternative outcome
Forced departures Inverse mills Ratio 0.059 ** 0.044 ** 0.039 **
with separate annc. P-value (0.037) (0.038) (0.013)
of successor CEO Intercept -0.002 -0.009 ** -0.008 *
(N=169) P-value (0.154) (0.025) (0.086)
Adj. R-square 0.008 0.009 0.008
Forced vs. Voluntary turnover alternative outcome
Forced departures Inverse mills Ratio 0.036 ** 0.063 *** 0.055 **
with separate annc. P-value (0.023) (0.009) (0.026)
of successor CEO Intercept -0.009 *** -0.017 ** -0.015 ***
(N=169) P-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Adj. R-square 0.010 0.0136 0.009
Correlation between IMRs and alternative event window returns
Univariate Regression of abnormal returns on IMR
This table presents univariate analysis of the relation between the Inverse Mills Ratio and the abnormal 
announcement return measured using alternative event windows.  Panel A presents univariate correlations; and 
Panel B presents results obtained by regressing the abnormal return (CAR) on the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR)  in 
a model that includes an intercept.  
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Table A-11
Forced Forced Forced Forced
departures with departures with departures with departures with
separate annc. same day annc. separate annc. same day annc.
dates dates dates dates
(N=169) (N=187) (N=169) (N=187)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.096 *** 0.047 ** 0.120 **
*
0.081 *
(0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000)
Age of incumbent  CEO 0.002 -0.002 *** -0.008 *** -0.001 ***
(0.325) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Incumbent CEO tenure -0.007 *** 0.000 -0.007 *** -0.004
(0.006) (0.988) (0.002) (0.764)
Natural log of total assets in yr. prior to CEO turnover 0.012 * -0.001 0.008 0.006
(0.061) (0.568) (0.107) (0.884)
3 year change in Ind. Adjusted Operating OROA -0.002 -0.006 * -0.001 -0.001 **
(0.112) (0.078) (0.190) (0.012)
Market model BHAR 6 months prior to turnover -0.019 *** -0.029 * -0.044 ** -0.005
(0.009) (0.095) (0.029) (0.150)
Industry Homogeneity in year prior to turnover 0.005 * 0.000 0.003 0.000
(0.096) (0.839) (0.296) (0.753)
Ind. Average ROA in year prior to turnover -0.001 0.001 * 0.001 0.001
(0.834) (0.067) (0.247) (0.045)
Regulated Industry -0.002 0.001 0.006 0.004
(0.190) (0.294) (0.813) (0.308)
Six month  market BHR prior to turnover -0.015 -0.036 -0.006 -0.014
(0.794) (0.326) (0.190) (0.697)
Percent Independent Directors -0.008 -0.023 -0.047 -0.017
(0.227) (0.531) (0.495) (0.608)
Average age of board members 0.007 ** -0.001 0.009 ** 0.000
(0.039) (0.542) (0.023) (0.848)
Board size 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.002
(0.388) (0.571) (0.311) (0.549)
Indicator of Classified board 0.025 0.010 0.017 0.006
(0.237) (0.560) (0.391) (0.692)
Constant -0.135 *** -0.061 -0.032 -0.072 ***
(0.000) (0.530) (0.149) (0.004)
Wald Chi-square 74.69 22.82 77.79 46.93
Probability > Chi-square 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.000
Wald (test of independent equations) P.> Chi-square 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.059
This table presents second stage results of Heckman regressions.   The dependent variable in the outcome equation is 
the cumulative abnormal return are based on a two day window (0, 1).  Robust standard errors are adjusted for clusters 
in three digit SIC codes.  P-values are presented in parentheses.
Forced vs. no turnover
Alternative outcome
Forced vs voluntary
Alternative outcome
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APPENDIX B 
 
TABLES OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF 
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS’ DECISIONS 
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTERNAL MARKET FOR CEO TALENT 
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Table B-1
Panel A:  CEO departure types
Full Internal External Intra-industry Inter-industry
Sample Successions Successions Successions Successions
N % N N % N N %
Planned Succession 578 36.4% 505 73 12.7% 24 49 66.8%
Unplanned Retirement 473 29.8% 304 169 35.7% 44 125 74.1%
CEO is hired away 57 3.6% 39 18 31.5% 5 13 72.3%
CEO death or health problems 30 1.9% 21 9 30.0% 3 6 66.7%
Forced Departure 449 28.3% 264 185 41.3% 77 131 70.6%
1,587 1,133 454 28.6% 130 324 71.4%
Panel B:  Prior employment type of externally hired CEOs:  Public, Private, or Foreign
External Intra-industry Inter-industry
Successions Successions Successions
N % N N %
Publicly traded firm (U.S. or Canada based listing) 341 75.1% 104 237 73.1%
Private firm or partnership 94 20.7% 22 72 22.2%
Foreign firm 19 4.2% 4 15 4.6%
This Table presents data on CEO departure types and the most recent employment situation of newly 
hired outside CEOs.  Data on CEO departure types are obtained for a search of Lexis Nexis news 
announcements.  Plannned successions include those that are described as planned in news 
announcements, or those that are announced at least six months in advance of the incumbent CEO's 
departure.  Forced CEO departures include those are described as forced in news announcements, or meet 
the following three criteria:  1) The departure was not announced at least six months in advance, 2), the 
departing CEO is under the age of 60, and 3) the  CEO does not leave in order to take another job 
elsewhere, or because of health issues or death.   Unplanned retirments include all CEO departures that 
are not included in any of the other five departure types.  Data on the new CEOs' prior employment is from 
Compustat, Hoover's Company Records, Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations, or ReferenceUSA. 
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Table B-2
CEO Succession Firm years No CEO turnover firm years
(N=1,557) (N=13,190)
Mean Median Mean Median P-value
Industry Homogeneity proxy (%) 12.56 12.61 13.27 13.29 *** 0.000
Segment sales Herfindahl Index (%) 18.78 13.48 20.28 15.01 ** 0.025
Lagged Industry adjusted OROA 4.06 2.21 5.26 3.15 *** 0.002
Lagged 12 month Market Model BHAR -19.73 -20.54 -0.08 -0.11 *** 0.000
Industry Average ROA -6.17 -1.76 -5.92 -1.72 0.759
Lagged 12 month Market BHR % 6.25 7.32 8.20 13.00 *** 0.000
Total Assets (Millions of $) 10,732.70 8,073.31 8,716.91 7,618.99 *** 0.000
Board size 9.58 8 9.22 7 *** 0.000
Independent directors  (%) 65.28 60.21 63.96 57.14 *** 0.004
Classified board 61.31 1.00 58.62 0 *** 0.000
Average number of other Boards 0.92 0.40 0.82 0.20 *** 0.000
CEO Age 58.95 60 59.27 58.68 *** 0.000
CEO Tenure (years) 8.87 6.68 8.58 7 ** 0.031
This table presents mean and medians for variables of interest and control variables.  P-values for tests of 
differences between the medians of the two samples are presented to the right.   The industry homogeneity 
proxy is calculated following the method of Parrino (1997).  The segment sales Herfindahl index is based on 
Compustat Segment date, and includes segment sales percentages at the four digit SIC industry level.   
Industry adjusted OROA is calculated as sales less operating expenses, divided by total assets.  Twelve 
month market model buy and hold returns are based on the value weighted CRSP index.  Industry average 
ROA is the simple average for two digit SIC industry classifications.   Board independence is measured as 
the percentage of independent directors on the firm's board; average number of other boards is the simple 
average of other corporate board .  Average board age is the simple average of directors' age in years.
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Table B-3
Firm Ind. Adj. Firm MM Ind. Average Market BHR CEO Age CEO Total Assets Board Board Classified Num. Other Planned Unplanned Forced Outside Out of Ind.
Focus Proxy OROA BHAR ROA Year Prior Tenure (Logged) Independence Size Board Boards Succession Retirement Succession Succession Succession
Industry Homogeneity proxy 0.015 *** 0.019 ** 0.006 -0.065 0.002 -0.039 *** -0.039 *** -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.008 0.002 -0.028 0.021 0.022 0.022 -0.033 ***
0.000 0.014 0.489 0.000 0.808 0.000 0.000 0.486 0.977 0.931 0.320 0.725 0.236 0.382 0.933 0.368 0.000
Firm Focus Proxy -0.09 *** -0.033 *** 0.119 *** 0.129 *** -0.011 0.015 * -0.022 *** -0.12 -0.047 *** -0.036 *** -0.197 *** -0.03 0.023 0.004 -0.009 -0.023 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.165 0.051 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.163 0.349 0.868 0.706 0.003
Industry adjusted OROA 0.067 *** -0.221 *** -0.035 *** 0.021 *** 0.032 *** 0.095 *** 0.064 *** 0.053 *** 0.053 *** 0.021 *** 0.098 *** 0.007 -0.124 *** -0.129 *** -0.018 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.755 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm MM BHAR year prior 0.033 -0.118 *** 0.049 *** -0.009 0.014 * -0.01 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.153 *** -0.02 * -0.139 *** -0.193 *** -0.066 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.227 0.079 0.144 0.208 0.407 0.163 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000
Industry average ROA 0.076 *** 0.047 *** 0.035 *** 0.181 *** 0.032 *** 0.099 *** 0.030 *** -0.003 0.021 0.023 -0.063 *** -0.054 ** -0.003
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.660 0.194 0.344 0.009 0.025 0.683
Market BHR year prior -0.004 0.000 -0.057 *** 0.074 *** 0.090 *** 0.062 *** -0.105 *** 0.018 -0.01 0.032 -0.003 -0.009
0.601 0.968 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.485 0.768 0.202 0.885 0.250
CEO age 0.137 *** 0.040 *** 0.029 *** 0.052 *** 0.005 0.020 *** 0.265 *** 0.116 *** -0.432 *** -0.147 *** -0.122 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.501 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CEO tenure -0.037 *** -0.041 *** -0.003 -0.01 -0.106 *** 0.140 *** 0.037 -0.197 *** -0.126 *** -0.03 ***
0.000 0.000 0.661 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total Assets (logged) 0.238 *** 0.364 *** 0.124 *** 0.311 *** 0.118 *** -0.06 *** -0.074 *** -0.129 *** -0.015 *
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059
Board Independence 0.316 *** 0.249 *** 0.179 *** 0.079 *** 0.032 -0.046 0.09 * 0.019 **
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.182 0.158 0.082 0.011
Board Size 0.238 *** 0.239 *** 0.102 *** -0.040 * -0.071 *** -0.078 *** 0.007
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.003 0.001 0.387
Classified board 0.316 ***+ 0.057 ** -0.05 * -0.011 -0.025 0.012
0.000 0.019 0.061 0.637 0.309 0.134
Number of other board memberships 0.091 *** -0.06 ** -0.028 -0.012 0.024 ***
0.000 0.023 0.245 0.631 0.002
Planned Succession -0.275 *** -0.225 ***
0.000 0.000
Unplanned Retirement 0.118 *** 0.096 ***
0.000 0.000
Forced Succession 0.171 *** 0.136 ***
0.036 0.001
This table presents Correlations for all variables of interest included in the analysis.  The correlations between variables specific to the turnover sample include only 1499 observations; correlations between other variables are 
based upon the full sample of turnover and non-turnover firm years (N=14,690).  P-values are presented beneath each correlation coefficent.  
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Table B-4
Planned Unplanned CEO is Forced 
Succession Retirement Hired Away Departure
(578) (473) (57) (449)
Odds Standardized Odds Standardized Odds Standardized Odds Standardized
Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate
Industry Homogeneity proxy (%) 1.01 1.009 0.809 0.687 0.968 0.944 0.839 0.733
(0.931) (0.112) (0.681) (0.209)
Segment Sales Herfindahl Index (%) 0.999 0.935 1.000 1.544 0.997 0.630 ** 1.000 1.03
(0.318) (0.569) (0.049) (0.457)
Lagged Industry adjusted OROA 1.015 1.195 * 0.985 0.836 1.030 1.426 *** 0.991 0.89 **
(0.024) (0.025) (0.000) (0.021)
Lagged 12 month MM BHAR 0.987 0.992 0.879 0.925 0.981 0.989 0.588 0.727 ***
(0.889) (0.652) (0.801) (0.000)
Industry Average ROA 0.99 0.916 * 1.005 1.063 1.008 1.102 0.986 0.857 **
(0.064) (0.590) (0.115) (0.050)
Lagged 12 month Market BHR 1.003 1.061 0.997 0.951 0.999 0.991 0.979 0.996 *
(0.398) (0.808) (0.917) (0.059)
Natural log of Total Assets 1.165 1.248 ** 1.120 1.179 1.067 1.098 1.135 1.201 ***
(0.013) (0.478) (0.243) (0.001)
Independent directors  (%) 0.753 0.911 1.187 1.058 1.088 1.028 0.933 0.977
(0.540) (0.818) (0.850) (0.817)
Board size 1.033 1.169 ** 1.021 1.105 1.083 1.466 * 1.046 1.241
(0.037) (0.322) (0.087) (0.036)
Classified board Indicator 1.266 1.120 *** 1.018 1.009 1.593 1.250 1.075 1.035
(0.006) (0.880) (0.184) (0.682)
Average number of other boards 1.277 1.167 *** 0.999 0.999 0.979 0.987 1.071 1.044
(0.002) (0.989) (0.942) (0.541)
CEO Age 1.442 2.590 *** 1.361 2.229 ** 0.654 0.332 *** 0.661 0.341 ***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Tenure (years) 1.087 1.885 *** 0.992 0.941 0.859 0.315 *** 0.925 0.553 ***
(0.000) (0.626) (0.002) (0.001)
CEO Tenure Squared 0.998 1.000 *** 1.000 2.225 1.003 1.306 ** 1.001 1.306 ***
(0.000) (0.657) (0.029) (0.003)
Psuedo R-square 0.197
This table presents results of a multinomial logit regression modeling alternative CEO departure outcomes versus the no 
turnover reference category.  The regression includes 14,747 observations; the number of observations within each 
header CEO departure type are listed beneath the column headers in parentheses.  Robust standard errors are clustered 
by 2 digit SIC code.  Estimated coefficients have been converted to odds ratios.  These are presented to the left; the right 
column for each regression model shows  standardized effects for the odds ratios.    The standardized effects are 
interpreted as the factor change in the odds ratio for a one standard deviation change in each covariate.  Descriptions of 
CEO departure type classification methods are presented in Table B-1.  All other variable definitions are described in 
Table B-2.
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Table B-5 
              This table presents logit and multinomial logistic regression results for alternative models of external CEO succession decisions within the full CEO succession 
sample.  The number of observations included in each regression and the number of observations within the listed subsamples are listed beneath each column 
header.   Robust standard errors are adjusted for 60 clusters in two digit SIC codes. Estimated coefficients have been converted to odds ratios.  These are 
presented to the left; the right column for each regression model shows  standardized estimates for the odds ratios.    The standardized effects are interpreted as 
the factor change in the odds ratio for a one standard deviation change in each covariate. 
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Logistic Regression 
 
Multinomial logit 
 
Logistic Regression 
 
External Succession External Intra-industry External Inter-industry External inter-industry  
 
vs. Internal succession Succession 
 
Succession 
  
Succession vs. 
 
reference category 
 
vs. Internal succession vs. Internal succession External intra-industry 
 
      
 
reference category reference category 
 
reference category 
 
Full sample:  1499 
 
Full sample:  1499 
    
Full sample:  427 
 
External: 454 
  
Ext. Intra-industry: 130 Ext. Inter-industry: 324 Ext. Inter-industry: 324 
               
 
Odds  Standardized Odds  Standardized Odds  Standardized Odds  Standardized 
 
Ratio Estimate   Ratio Estimate   Ratio Estimate   Ratio Estimate 
Industry Homogeneity proxy  1.005 1.021 
  
1.001 1.004 
 
1.007 1.032 
  
1.017 1.076 
 
 
(0.730) 
   
(0.730) 
  
(0.644) 
   
(0.678) 
  Segment Sales Herfindahl Index  0.999 0.953 
  
0.999 0.745 
 
0.988 0.857 * 
 
0.979 0.720 * 
 
(0.362) 
   
(0.175) 
  
(0.093) 
   
(0.067) 
  Lagged Industry adjusted OROA 0.992 0.897 
  
0.983 0.808 ** 0.998 0.787 
  
1.021 1.384 *** 
 
(0.119) 
   
(0.000) 
  
(0.747) 
   
(0.000) 
  Lagged 12 month Market Model BHAR  0.561 0.716 *** 
 
0.532 0.695 *** 0.568 0.722 *** 
 
1.081 1.037 
 
 
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
   
(0.727) 
  Industry Average ROA 0.996 0.956 * 
 
0.985 0.842 * 0.988 0.866 * 
 
1.018 1.215 
 
 
(0.092) 
   
(0.085) 
  
(0.097) 
   
(0.144) 
  Lagged 12 month Market BHR 0.998 0.716 
  
0.993 0.867 
 
0.993 0.853 
  
1.010 1.205 
 
 
(0.637) 
   
(0.147) 
  
(0.121) 
   
(0.170) 
  Natural log of Total Assets 0.866 0.805 *** 
 
0.946 0.920 
 
0.854 0.788 *** 
 
0.950 0.928 
 
 
(0.010) 
   
(0.567) 
  
(0.006) 
   
(0.765) 
  Independent directors   1.893 1.225 ** 
 
1.644 1.171 
 
1.975 1.241 ** 
 
1.276 1.084 
 
 
(0.048) 
   
(0.398) 
  
(0.044) 
   
(0.102) 
  Board size 0.941 0.749 *** 
 
0.952 0.793 
 
0.935 0.726 *** 
 
0.993 0.911 
 
 
(0.005) 
   
(0.121) 
  
(0.009) 
   
(0.894) 
  Classified board Indicator 0.948 0.975 
  
1.137 1.064 
 
0.874 0.936 
  
0.783 0.898 
 
 
(0.736) 
   
(0.593) 
  
(0.465) 
   
(0.442) 
  Average number of other boards 1.150 1.100 
  
1.023 1.016 
 
1.121 1.139 
  
1.346 1.216 ** 
 
(0.190) 
   
(0.913) 
  
(0.175) 
   
(0.045) 
  Incumbent Tenure 0.963 0.723 ** 
 
0.881 0.340 * 0.935 0.567 *** 
 
0.882 0.409 *** 
 
(0.032) 
   
(0.056) 
  
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
  Tenure squared 1.003 1.126 ** 
 
1.004 3.503 ** 1.001 1.433 ** 
 
1.004 2.667 *** 
 
(0.452) 
   
(0.005) 
  
(0.017) 
   
(0.005) 
  Planned Succession 0.277 0.535 *** 
 
0.757 0.873 
 
0.254 0.513 *** 
 
0.737 0.888 
 
 
(0.000) 
   
(0.381) 
  
(0.000) 
   
(0.363) 
  
               Psuedo R-square 0.115       0.104             0.086     
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Table B-6
Planned external Unplanned  retirement Forced external 
Succession external Succession Succession
vs. planned internal vs. Internal Unplanned vs. involuntary internal
reference category voluntary reference category reference category
Internal: 505 Internal: 304 Internal: 264
External: 73 External: 169 External: 185
Odds Standardized Odds Standardized Odds Standardized
Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate
Industry Homogeneity proxy 1.047 1.220 ** 0.973 0.888 1.035
(0.032) (0.262) (0.254)
Segment Sales Herfindahl Index 0.999 0.968 1.000 0.925 0.999 0.775
(0.679) (0.370) (0.224)
Lagged Industry adjusted OROA 0.979 0.747 ** 0.995 0.828 ** 0.971 0.665 ***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.000)
Lagged 12 month Market Model BHAR 0.699 0.813 0.479 0.653 *** 0.575 0.727 ***
(0.177) (0.000) (0.001)
Industry Average ROA 0.986 0.849 ** 0.992 0.916 0.990 0.892
(0.013) (0.169) (0.185)
Lagged 12 month Market BHR 1.007 1.139 0.997 0.936 0.997 0.954
(0.327) (0.604) (0.298)
Natural log of Total Assets 0.804 0.802 *** 0.846 0.773 *** 0.885 0.805
(0.064) (0.002) (0.166)
Independent directors  1.190 1.191 3.359 1.469 *** 1.687 1.181 **
(0.861) (0.005) (0.336)
Board size 1.005 1.031 0.899 0.627 ** 0.949 0.782 **
(0.903) (0.008) (0.279)
Classified board 0.662 0.819 0.838 0.918 1.027 1.013
(0.178) (0.386) (0.916)
Average number of other boards 0.930 0.952 1.290 1.190 1.165 1.108
(0.717) (0.201) (0.364)
CEO age 1.041 1.378 *** 1.041 1.375 *** 0.852 0.277 ***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
CEO tenure 0.979 0.972 0.928 0.533 *** 0.924 0.512 ***
(0.129) (0.004) (0.004)
Tenure squared 0.998 0.528 1.001 1.524 ** 1.000 0.985
(0.112) (0.029) (0.970)
Psuedo R-square 0.081 0.065 0.060
Multinomial logit regressions of CEO succession choices compared to  the internal succession reference category.   Each 
model  includes 1499 observations, alternative succession types are modeled as separate choice outcomes but these are not 
presented in order to conserve space.   The number of observations in each outcome category are listed immediately beneath 
each column header.  CEO successions in which the departing CEO is hired away are deleted from the sample.  The forced  
succession category includes both possibly forced and forced CEO departures.  Robust standard errors are adjusted for 60 
clusters in two digit SIC codes.  Odds ratios are presented to the left in the results for each model; and standardized risk ratios 
are presented to the right.    The interpretation of the standardized estimates is the factor change in the odds ratio for a one 
standard deviation change in the regressor.
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Table B-7
Planned external Planned external Unplanned external Unplanned external Involuntary external Involuntary  external 
Intra-industry Inter-industry Intra-industry Inter-industry Intra-industry Inter-industry
Succession Succession Succession Succession Succession Succession
(24) (49) (44) (125) (77) (131)
Odds Standardized Odds Standardized Odds Standardized Odds Standardized Odds StandardizedOdds Standardized
Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate
Industry Homogeneity proxy 1.071 1.184 *** 1.049 1.235 1.002 1.011 0.974 0.945 0.967 0.863 0.983 0.929
(0.003) (0.539) (0.965) (0.291) (0.497) (0.663)
Segment Sales Herfindahl Index 1.001 1.453 0.998 0.682 1.000 1.332 0.985 0.891 *** 1.001 1.215 0.998 0.665 *
(0.161) (0.770) (0.150) (0.004) (0.553) (0.070)
Lagged Industry adjusted OROA 0.964 0.886 ** 0.992 0.882 0.972 0.673 *** 0.986 0.827 0.987 0.843 ** 0.963 0.795
(0.037) (0.541) (0.004) (0.174) (0.025) (0.120)
Firm Lagged 12 month MM BHAR 0.573 0.739 0.999 0.955 0.757 0.852 0.347 0.543 *** 0.553 0.711 *** 0.414 0.601 ***
(0.143) (0.388) (0.384) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Industry Average ROA 0.991 0.868 ** 0.986 0.850 0.969 0.0697 ** 0.979 0.786 ** 0.986 0.854 0.981 0.805 *
(0.037) (0.132) (0.049) (0.024) (0.226) (0.270)
Lagged 12 month Market BHR 0.984 0.646 * 0.997 0.954 0.999 0.979 0.999 0.998 0.988 0.795 ** 0.989 0.813
(0.051) (0.753) (0.865) (0.869) (0.044) (0.263)
Natural log of Total Assets 1.158 1.612 0.708 0.594 ** 0.989 0.983 0.822 0.743 ** 0.952 0.929 0.846 0.777 *
(0.320) (0.014) (0.955) (0.019) (0.670) (0.086)
Independent directors  5.606 1.728 6.749 1.832 * 2.342 1.310 5.551 1.723 *** 0.757 0.915 2.081 1.262 *
(0.170) (0.055) (0.285) (0.010) (0.775) (0.077)
Board size 0.861 0.590 0.898 0.599 * 0.936 0.728 0.875 0.531 * 1.127 1.467 1.091 1.518 *
(0.133) (0.100) (0.393) (0.066) (0.149) (0.063)
Classified board 1.266 1.121 0.999 0.999 1.64 1.271 1.306 1.138 1.244 1.112 1.230 1.106
(0.694) (0.989) (0.287) (0.523) (0.573) (0.535)
Average number of other boards 0.831 0.882 1.259 1.169 0.703 0.788 0.792 0.854 0.976 0.984 1.082 1.055
(0.660) (0.409) (0.193) (0.347) (0.912) (0.676)
CEO age 1.018 1.151 1.055 1.532 *** 0.989 0.919 0.963 0.740 * 1.019 1.165 * 0.863 0.308 ***
(0.777) (0.002) (0.691) (0.082) (0.396) (0.000)
CEO tenure 1.154 3.395 ** 1.194 4.551 ** 1.109 2.423 * 0.984 0.875 1.042 1.421 0.971 0.779
(0.047) (0.024) (0.079) (0.790) (0.531) (0.447)
CEO tenure squared 0.995 0.230 0.995 0.167 ** 0.996 0.369 0.999 0.835 1.002 1.847 0.999 0.968
(0.329) (0.016) (0.198) (0.815) (0.630) (0.227)
Psuedo R-square 0.084 0.089 0.103
Planned internal succession 
reference category
Unplanned retirement internal 
succession reference 
category
Multinomial logit regressions of CEO succession choices compared to  an internal succession reference category.  Each model  includes 1499 CEO 
turnovers.  Robust standard errors are adjusted for 60 clusters in two digit SIC codes.   Numbers in parentheses directly beneath each column 
header show the number of observations in the respective succession outcome.    Odds ratios are presented to the left in the results, and 
standardized risk ratios are presented to the right.    The interpretation of the standardized estimates is the factor change in the odds ratio for a one 
standard deviation change in the regressor.
Forced internal succession 
reference category
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Table B-8
Panel A 
Search Firm  Search firm
Hired Not Hired P-value
(N=85) (N=327)
Planned succession 17.78 16.01 0.731
Unplanned retirement 45.55 40.73 0.997
Forced 36.67 43.26 0.543
Inter-industry hire 67.77 71.98 0.961
Panel B 
Search Firm  Search firm
Hired Not Hired
(N=85) (N=327)
CEO Age 58.00 58.00 0.859
Industry Homogeneity proxy (%) 12.91 12.36 ** 0.036
Segment Sales Herfindahl Index (%) 13.32 13.98 0.626
Lagged Industry adjusted OROA 2.61 0.47 0.165
Lagged 12 month Market Model BHAR -15.53 -36.71 0.465
Total Assets 2,572.20 1,046.31 *** 0.000
Lagged 12 month Market BHR 7.53 7.32 0.212
Industry Average ROA -1.32 -3.75 0.015
Independent directors  (%) 61.05 60.09 0.279
Board size 9.00 7.00 *** 0.003
Classified board 61.00 56.12 0.518
Average number of other boards 0.43 0.33 ** 0.015
This table presents means and difference of medians test results for firms that report hiring an 
executive search firm to aid in the search for the replacement CEO, and those that do not.  
Data on firms' self-reported use of an executive search firm is based upon a search of news 
announcements and proxy statements.  The analysis includes 412 external successions.  
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Table B-9
Dependent variable: Dependent variable
Search firm hired New CEO survives
3 years or more
(N=412) (N=412)
Search firm=1:  85 Survives=1:  281
Odds Standardized Odds Standardized
Ratio Estimate Ratio Estimate
Industry Homogeneity proxy 1.065 1.339 * 1.053 1.274 **
(0.054) (0.050)
Segment Sales Herfindahl Index 0.999 0.967 0.998 0.775 *
(0.871) (0.053)
Lagged Industry adjusted OROA 0.987 0.821 ** 1.006 1.125
(0.016) (0.234)
Lagged 12 month Market Model BHAR 1.044 1.054 1.003 1.139 *
(0.871) (0.100)
Natural log of Total Assets 1.468 1.739 *** 1.094 1.128
(0.001) (0.346)
Industry Average ROA 1.014 1.163 1.005 1.072
(0.312) (0.584)
Lagged 12 month Market BHR 0.997 0.951 1.006 1.105
(0.719) (0.380)
Independent directors  1.151 1.042 0.905 0.951
(0.834) (0.852)
Board size 0.987 0.940 1.006 1.050
(0.722) (0.913)
Classified board 1.032 1.091 0.885 0.931
(0.928) (0.712)
Average number of other boards 1.071 1.090 1.220 1.140
(0.747) (0.262)
Age of new CEO in year hired 0.941 0.663 ***
(0.001)
Search firm assisted search 1.504 1.149
(0.180)
Psuedo R-square 0.085 0.084
This table presents logistic regression analysis of the choice of hiring an executive search firm to 
aid in the search for the replacement CEO, and the likelihood that the newly hired CEO survives 
the first three years.  Data on firms' self-reported use of an executive search firm is based upon a 
search of news announcements and proxy statements.  The regressions includes 412 external 
successions without missing data.  Robust standard errors are clustered by two digit SIC code.   
Odds ratios are presented to the left in the results, and standardized risk ratios are presented to 
the right.    The interpretation of the standardized estimates is the factor change in the odds ratio 
for a one standard deviation change in the regressor.
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Table B-10
Intra-industry Inter-industry 
CEO-firm match CEO-firm match
(N=169) (N=369)
General Management skills 72.58 73.45 0.827
Global experience 27.42 34.68 * 0.096
Strategy 0.2957 42.52 ** 0.022
Leadership 27.96 35.62 * 0.051
Marketing/Branding 39.78 45.5 0.129
Service/Customer Relations 5.85 9.89 * 0.076
Technical 52.15 45.26 * 0.059
Operations 93.02 88.36 ** 0.048
Industry reputation 12.37 6.65 *** 0.006
Restructuring 27.19 20.85 0.359
Cost reduction/profitability 36.02 37.05 0.808
Growth 47.84 56.87 ** 0.039
R&D/Innovation 17.2 14.48 0.392
Finance/Accounting 19.89 19.00 0.798
Legal 7.52 7.81 0.901
Acquisitions/mergers 23.12 15.43 ** 0.023
This table presents results for difference of  medians tests.  P-values are presented in the far 
right column.  Data on newly hired CEO's skills or experience are collected from news 
announcements at the time of the CEO's appointment.  The analysis includes 538 external CEO-
firm matches for which news reports with some commentary by the board of the hiring firm 
could be found, in the years 1997-2008.  
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